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
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The Filipino Martyrs



Ironclad Cruiser "Olympia"	5870 tons	under	Gridley
"Baltimore"	4000 "	"	Lamberton
"Boston"	3189 "	"	F. Wildes
"Raleigh"	4000 "	"	J. B. Coghlan
"Concord"	2000 "	"	A. Walker
"Petrel"	1890 "	"	E. P. Wood
"Za Fino" & "Nanshan"			

1 "Reina Christina"	3500 tons	Commanded by	Don Luis Cadarso
2 "Castilla"	3344 tons a Wooden Cruiser	" "	Capt. Morgado
3 "Don Antonio de Ulloa"	1100 tons	" "	Don Jose Sturralde
4 Don Juan de Austria	11000 tons	" "	Don Juan de la Concha
5 Isla de Luzon	1030 tons	" "	Jose Perez Moreno
6 Isla de Cuba	1030 tons		
Marquess del Duero	530 tons		

The Filipino Martyrs

A Story of the Crime of February 4, 1899

BY AN EYE WITNESS

Richard Brinsley Sheridan
Barrister at Law, Inner Temple

John Lane: The Bodley Head
London and New York
1900

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Preface

Before giving my views and opinions to the public upon the American policy in the Philippines, I desire to state the circumstances which took me to the islands.

On my return from Mexico and the United States in the early part of 1897, I had occasion to go to China with my old friend, Mr. Cumming Macdona, M.P.

After we had completed the work we had undertaken at Pekin, we decided to visit Manila, reputed in the East to be progressing under American rule.

Little was known of the Filipinos in those parts of China which we visited, except Hong Kong, where we heard varying reports, principally from Americans with commercial interests in the East.

I desire clearly to state that before we sailed for Manila I had no intention of

committing my views or opinions to paper, or of criticising either American policy or American discipline in the Philippines. I went there merely from idle curiosity to see the islands and the people. I did not understand that they were opposed to an American form of government, nor did I believe that there were issues to be considered by the great republic. I had frequently been told the Filipinos were a turbulent race of semi-barbarians, instinctively savage, and without the smallest desire to become civilised or to recognise the necessity either for religion or refinement.

When the American-Spanish War was declared in the cause of humanity and for the protection of a weak people from the cruelties of a merciless oppressor, I was an enthusiastic advocate of America's humane policy. I regarded Americans then as I do now, the champions of the suffering, and believed that they were prepared to sacrifice the blood and the lives of their citizens, at any cost, in order that justice should be done, and the weak emancipated from tyranny and deception. America was hailed as the Saviour of the oppressed, not only by the English-speaking

races of the earth, but by foreigners in all the continents of the world. The attitude of Great Britain clearly demonstrated the feeling of the people. If European complications had arisen, and America had needed England as an ally, England was undoubtedly prepared to join her Anglo-Saxon brethren in the support of their holy cause.

I refer to this only to show that before I went to Manila on the United States despatch "Zafiro" (by the kind permission of Consul General Wildman) my sympathies were entirely American, as they are to-day, aside from any mistaken foreign policy. I believed the United States had acquired the Philippine Islands, not only by right of conquest, but by right of purchase, and I admired the generous gift of twenty million dollars made to conquered and bankrupt Spain. But, after a short time in Manila, I discovered that the Filipinos had been grossly misrepresented. Where I had expected to meet people unworthy of recognition, I found men of refinement and cultivation; individuals of intellect and education, who objected to the American policy of extermination, and to the arrogance of Gen-

eral Otis. It is for the individual American after a careful investigation to consider whether that policy should be remedied by the United States government or by the people themselves.

In consequence of what I saw I decided to remain in the Philippines until I could collect sufficient information, which I was careful should be verified, as far as possible, and to write shortly and without animus a statement of those events which should long since have been brought to the knowledge of the American people.

I am satisfied that what I have written is almost entirely unknown to the majority now demanding information, in order to judge whether the Filipinos have been wronged or to decide whether the Americans have been duped.

The emancipators of slaves, the great advocates for justice, will not permit enormities to be committed in the name of liberty, or pledges to be broken in the cause of justice, and to remain unredressed and unfulfilled.

I do not dedicate this work to the government of the United States, but to the citizens

of America, in the North, the South, the East, and the West, who are known among nations and among men to be loyal to their creeds, both political and commercial, and to respect the rights and privileges of their fellow-creatures, no matter what the colour of their skin may be, or whether they be in peace or in times of war.

It is time the people, and not the government, took in hand this question, and insisted upon the publication of all letters and cables sent to the Philippines, and the replies received at Washington — then, and then only, will they be the true arbitrators of a cause which threatens to obliterate some of the most illustrious pages in American history.

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The Filipino Martyrs

CHAPTER I

In the following plain statement of facts, as I have seen and known them in the Philippines, I do not propose to enter into a detailed account of the history of the islands. It is well, however, to mention briefly, that they were discovered by Magellan in 1521, when he landed on Cebu. Later however he received a mortal wound on the island of Magtam.

In 1563, Philip II. of Spain sent an expedition from Mexico under the command of Legaspi. This adventurer took forcible possession of the island of Cebu in 1565, pacifying and annexing all the neighbouring islands. The archipelago was, in consequence, named after Philip II.

In 1570, Juan Salcedo, the grandson of Legaspi, was sent to the island of Luzon, where he was well received by Lacandola, Rajah of Tondo, and Soliman, Rajah of Manila.

In 1571, Legaspi proclaimed the sovereignty of Spain over the whole group of islands and made Manila the capital.

In 1574, a famous Chinese pirate of the name of Li-Ma-Hong, who had been outlawed by the Emperor of China, entered the bay of Manila, with some sixty-two armed junks and about five thousand men, and demanded the surrender of the city. Li-Ma-Hong was, however, defeated, and ultimately escaped to the north, where many of his followers intermarried with the natives of the island. The Dutch, always the enemies of Spain, were frequent invaders of the Philippines, but in all cases were repulsed.

In 1762, war having been declared by England against France and Spain, the British troops conquered Manila and entered the city on the 5th of October of that year.

By the treaty of Paris, dated the 10th of February, 1763, it was agreed that the British should evacuate Manila. They had retained possession for about one year. The forces were accordingly withdrawn, on Spain agreeing to pay a ransom.

The Philippine Islands have therefore been a Spanish colony for a period of some three hundred years, yet to-day they are still unexplored and undeveloped, not on account of the poverty of the islands, for there is no question of their immense wealth, metallurgically and agriculturally, but from the gross neglect of their indolent conqueror.

The estimated area is about one hundred thousand square miles. The archipelago comprises over a thousand islands, the more important being Luzon, Mindanao, Mindoro, Cebu, Negros, Panay, Leyte, etc.

The population may be divided into three groups. The inhabitants of the Lowlands, the Hill tribes, and the Mohammedans. The first of the group are Filipinos. They are a peaceable race of an extremely intelligent order, who suffered with patience for many years all the tortures of Spanish inquisitions and oppressions.

In the second group may be mentioned Igorrotes, Itavis, Gaddanes, Nigritos, and Tinguianes. These men are of a lower order both as regards intelligence and character. They are more in the nature of barbarians or savages, recognising no law; nevertheless they are peaceable and amiable. In the hunt they use for the most part the bow and arrow. As a rule, they avoid the civilised parts of the islands.

The third group are the Mohammedans, found principally in the northwestern parts of Mindanao and on other islands in the Sulu seas. These people are a fierce and warlike race, whose country is unsafe for Europeans without escort. They make their pilgrimages periodically to Mecca.

The Filipino Martyrs

Having dealt as briefly as possible with the history, and having sketched slightly the general character of the inhabitants, I propose to describe the position taken by the representatives of the American government in the Philippine Islands.



THE PRESIDENT OF THE FILIPINO REPUBLIC.

CHAPTER II

THE PHILIPPINES DURING THE WAR

Hopes of Filipinos on the Declaration of War between America and Spain — Spanish Corruption — Spanish Fleet goes to Subig, but quickly returns — Arrival of the American Squadron at Corregidor — Incompetency of Spanish Naval Officers — They were absent from their Ships on the Eve of the Battle of Manila Bay — Desertion of Spanish Sailors.

THE Filipino people, when war between America and Spain was declared, saw for the first time a ray of hope that their servitude to Spain, lasting nearly three centuries, might be terminated. They did not anticipate that America, whose home interests were so vast that it was almost inconceivable for her to care for conquest, would decide to increase her territories or extend her power in the East, and they therefore naturally expected that the issue of the war would be Filipino independence. The Filipinos were aware that the origin of the war was the inhuman treatment of the Cubans by Spanish administrators, and that America

had stated the war was undertaken in the interests of humanity, and not for the purpose of annexation or extension.

The American people are doubtless unaware of much that has since transpired in the Philippine Islands. They are ignorant of many important facts in connection with this war in the East, and they do not realise the situation in respect to the broken pledges given by American representatives to the Filipino leaders. There has been systematic deception, possibly for political reasons. They have no knowledge of the barbaric treatment to which the Filipinos were subjected by the American volunteers. Neither the American people nor the resident Europeans in the Philippines know the motives which induced General Otis to commence hostilities on the night of February 4, 1899.

At that time the American and European press was unrepresented in the islands, and later, when correspondents arrived at Manila, they found a censor appointed who would not permit telegrams either to be sent or to be received. So strictly were these instructions carried out, that European merchants were not allowed to transmit their ordinary business telegrams from Manila without first making a declaration that the messages contained no reference to the war.

Manila was under martial law of the severest

kind, and has been so since the 13th of August, 1898; and had the people of America known the real condition of the Filipinos, and the methods which were adopted to subjugate and to deceive them, it is probable they would have withdrawn their support and sympathy from a war which, although commenced with the highest and noblest motives, has been carried on by so continuous an exercise of cruelty and injustice, that it has involved the violation of all the rules of public faith and civilised warfare.

When the news reached Manila that the American fleet during the Spanish-American struggle had arrived at Hong Kong, it was hailed by both Europeans and Filipinos as the destroyer of Spanish rule, the full horrors of which have been absolutely unknown to the civilised nations of the Western world. Spain may well look east and regret the loss of a colony which naturally was one of the richest in the world, but which under her government became degenerated and demoralised. She may well reproach herself with a system of government which must be a lasting disgrace to her as a recognised Power; a system so loose and so wickedly disorganised that her colonial officers deceived her ministers at home, and appropriated monies provided for the advancement and improvement of the islands;—a system by

which the Spanish rulers robbed and plundered openly those whom it was their duty to protect, and to whom good moral influence and honest examples should have been given.

These officials, in league with certain renegade priests, — a shame to their religion and to their order, — traded on the power given them from Spain and from Rome, and with the worst motives worked upon the fears of a simple, superstitious, and law-abiding people. It is a strange enigma that Spain, surrounded by and in amicable communication with the greatest nations in the world, has alone failed to progress or to advance with modern civilisation; that she, the oldest of all colonisers, is remembered only for centuries of cruelty and persecution, and that, among the Christian nations of the earth, she alone remains unchanged. The terrors of the Inquisition and its elaborate tortures — the special feature of that Inquisition — have been perpetuated in her colonies, even down to the days of the recent war between herself and America.

It is no longer a matter for wonder that of all the colonies of that glorious empire, given her by the Pope, and subdued by the conquering arms of her adventurous sons, *not one now* remains — nothing but the record of her folly, her indescribable wickedness, and her everlasting shame.

The Spanish fleet in Philippine waters, intended and believed to be a sufficient protection for the islands, was regarded by the inhabitants of Manila, both Spanish and foreign, as more than useless. It was a well-known fact that the majority of her ships were unable to steam either at any great speed or to any great distance, and that they were officered by totally incompetent men.

When the American fleet was reported to have left Hong Kong for Manila, no steps had been taken to mine, at Corregidor, the entrance to the bay of Manila. No guns had been mounted, nor had any efforts been made to protect the entrance to the bay or to the harbour, which with ordinary care could have been made absolutely impregnable.

Before the arrival of the Americans at Manila, it was decided by the Spanish admiral to take such ships of his fleet as were able to steam to Subig Bay, which is beyond Corregidor on the north. Admiral Montojo knew that by no possibility could the enemy arrive there in time to give him battle, and he thought, therefore, it would appear to the home government that he had done a brave and daring deed in going out into the China seas to meet his American opponents. Scarcely had he arrived at Subig than he received information that the American fleet had been sighted at the northern

end of the island of Luzon. He issued immediate instructions for his fleet to return to Cavite, and there take up their positions in the shallowest water, at Sangley Point.

I do not suggest that the Spanish officers and men were necessarily cowards, but they obviously knew that their unseaworthy vessels were unfit to enter into any naval engagement, and that their guns were of such a character and in such a condition as to render them practically useless.

The Spanish sailors, too, were aware that their superior officers were incompetent to command or to control their vessels. It is known that many of these officers were not in command of their ships, but were spending the night of the 30th of April in the cafés of the city of Manila.

On war being declared, it was rumored that some two hundred and twenty-four Spanish sailors deserted from their ships.

CHAPTER III

Entrances to Manila Bay reported mined — Courageous entrance of Admiral Dewey with his Ships — Condition of the Spanish Fleet — Ships scuttled by their Commanders — Description of the Engagement — Little or no Damage done to the American Vessels — Fears of European Merchants — Admiral Dewey's Opinion of the Battle — A Dangerous Torpedo Boat — Capture of Cavite.

On the night of the 30th of April, 1898, Commodore Dewey arrived off the island of Corregidor, which from the map will be seen to control the entrance to the bay of Manila. This island is some three miles distant from the mainland of Bataan on the north, and some twenty miles distant from the mainland of Cavite province on the south. Vessels can enter the bay by either channel. Both had been reported to Commodore Dewey to have been so "dangerously mined" that neither merchant nor war vessels could enter Manila without certain and total destruction. This was the position in which the American commander found himself on that dark night of the 30th of April. All lights on the main-

lands and on Corregidor had been extinguished, and all lights on the American ships had also been screened. Under the most favorable circumstances, navigation is difficult and dangerous in these channels. How much more difficult must Dewey have found it!

Notwithstanding the darkness and the reported mines, he bravely determined to enter the bay. He issued instructions for his ships to steam in single file with his own flagship "Olympia" at their head. That this was a courageous step none can doubt, and all must admire and praise him for it. He had not travelled far before he was discovered by the Spaniards, who commenced firing their old twelve centimetre guns; but these were unable to do any damage to the American ships. To such attentions the Commodore paid no heed, — he did not fear them, — his only anxiety was lest he should be blown to pieces by the supposed mines.

Dewey, with his squadron, having entered the bay, had no further difficulty in steaming the thirty miles to Manila and thence to Cavite. After sailing in a circle between Manila and Cavite, the American fleet entered the cove of Bacoor. The Sangley Point battery then opened fire, but their shells fell short of the American ships. It is not necessary for me to enter into the details of this supposed great battle and

greater victory. It is believed by the Americans that their war vessels destroyed the Spanish fleet, but this was not so; the Spaniards in many cases having taken up their positions in shallow water, scuttled their own ships, so that a great many officers and men escaped with their lives.

Much ado has been made about very little. Commodore Dewey had received his instructions "to proceed to Manila, and there destroy the Spanish fleet in Philippine waters." Had that fleet been as powerful as was generally believed, and had Dewey met with the opposition that was anticipated, he would, nevertheless, regardless of his own life or the lives of those in his charge, have endeavoured to carry out his instructions. Had the money provided by Spain for the maintenance of Philippine defence not been improperly employed for the enrichment of her representatives in the East, and had her fleet been properly armed, strengthened, officered, and manned, the honour and credit of Spain might have been saved, though there still could have been but one result, — the disappearance forever of Spanish power in the East.

Admiral Dewey with indomitable will and with almost unequalled pluck, with his ships manned by men on whom he knew he could rely, men willing to die for their country at his

order, could not have failed to crush in a naval engagement the boldest, the fiercest, or the most capable and intelligent of Spanish admirals commanding the finest of Spanish fleets. But the American fleet had practically no contest or engagement in connection with the destruction of the Spanish ships. The first gun was fired at 5.10 A.M. on the 1st of May, and the combat had practically ended at 7 A.M., when the Americans withdrew for their breakfast, returning afterwards at 11 o'clock A.M. to complete their victory.

With the exception of the "Baltimore," which was slightly damaged, the American ships were uninjured. The European merchants, watching the engagement from the tower of the Manila Club, know how little was the danger the Americans had to face.

The Spanish losses, of course, were large, though they have been greatly exaggerated. In all, Spain lost thirteen vessels, many being old tubs, of which, as I have said, several were scuttled by the Spaniards themselves. Three of those vessels have since been raised by the Americans.

In this statement of facts, it is not intended in any way to diminish the honour and glory of the victory won by the American fleet in Manila Bay on the morning of the 1st of May. Admiral Dewey, whom I have the pleasure and

honour of knowing, is one of the kindest and most agreeable of men, one of the bravest and ablest of admirals in the present navies of the world; but he does not himself suggest that this engagement was a fierce encounter, deserving a place in the records of great sea fights.

At the close of the engagement it was reported in America, and all over the world, that a desperate and daring attempt was made by a small torpedo boat to destroy one of the American vessels. This boat, it was alleged, shot with great rapidity from the shore at Sangley Point, Cavite, in the direction of the American warships, and only after great difficulty, and a determined struggle, was she sunk by the American guns. It would be well to say that on Sangley Point there is a "slip," or small dock, where vessels can be repaired. It is owned by a Spanish company, with Spanish, English, and Filipino capital. The manager of this slip is a Scotch gentleman, a Mr. Young, whose house is close to the slip and was damaged by the American shells. Fearing that his property was likely to be destroyed, either by fire or otherwise, he packed his small effects in his steam launch, which he despatched to Manila. Mr. Young himself told me, that this launch was the terrible torpedo boat reported to have been destroyed by the American ships.

Admiral Dewey took possession of Cavite and the arsenal in that city on the 2d of May, and anchored his fleet within a short distance of its walls.

CHAPTER IV

Admiral Dewey awaiting Instructions from Washington — Foreign Vessels permitted in Manila Harbour — Sir Edward Chichester's Attitude — German Interference — Admiral Dewey threatens German Admiral — Blockade and Condition of Manila

IT is admitted that neither on the 1st of May, when the Spanish fleet was destroyed, nor on the 13th of August, 1898, when Manila was taken, was it America's intention to annex the Philippine Islands.

After Admiral Dewey had taken possession of Cavite, he had to await further instructions from Washington, his mission to the Philippines having been fulfilled. Meantime he declared the blockade of Manila. Foreign vessels by Admiral Dewey's courtesy were permitted to remain in the bay, and it was at this time that Sir Edward Chichester, captain of the "Immortalité," by his amiability and tact, assisted in removing whatever ill feeling may have existed before the war between the American and the English people. Whether ill feeling really existed between these two Anglo-Saxon nations is doubtful; but whether

it did or not, when America urged war *in the cause of common humanity*, every Englishman in all Great Britain's colonies sympathised heartily with her, and all were prepared to support her in every way and in every part of the world, in the great campaign of civilisation.

England had stationed in the bay of Manila seven war vessels, Germany had four, and other nations also were fairly represented. Of all the powers assembled, Germany alone endeavoured to frustrate, embarrass, and make more difficult Admiral Dewey's manœuvres in the Philippine waters.

This appears almost incredible when we remember that the two nations were on friendly terms; but Admiral Dewey told me himself that at night the Germans would send their boats from ship to ship. He bore with patience this gross breach of naval etiquette until he found it necessary to prevent the continuance of such discourtesy. On one occasion, he told me, he was compelled to fire across the bows of a German vessel, in order to put a stop to further disobedience of international rules.

Admiral Dewey did not forget that when he was in Hong Kong, Prince Henry said *that Germany would not permit America to annex the Philippine Islands.*

It was generally reported in Manila at this time that the Germans were endeavouring to

assist the Spaniards. On one occasion, Admiral Dewey, having a certain German vessel between his flagship and another of his vessels, invited the German commander to meet him. At the interview, Admiral Dewey complained of German boats making visits at night, without special permission, to other ships in the harbour, and reminded the German officer that it was by his (the Admiral's) courtesy only, that his vessels were permitted to anchor in this blockaded port; that the action complained of amounted technically to an act of war; and, added Admiral Dewey, "as we are in for it now, it matters little to us whether we fight Spain, or Germany, or the world; and if you desire war, you can have it right here. You need not cable to Berlin, nor need I to Washington; you can just have war here and now." It is needless to say that the German commander, whether he had acted on instructions from Berlin or not, did not desire war then or at any other time; and Admiral Dewey in taking this bold and proper step saved himself all further annoyance and interference at the hands of that German commander.

Very shortly after the commencement of the blockade its disastrous effects were felt by the inhabitants of Manila; food became scarce, and prices ruled extremely high. It was rumoured in the city that Admiral Dewey was compelled

to refrain from bombarding Manila on account of the shortness of his ammunition; but this, I think, most improbable. I believe, and indeed Admiral Dewey confirmed my belief, that the immunity of the city was due entirely to the forbearance of the Admiral, whose kindness of heart and clearness of purpose has made him so much respected in all parts of the East where he has held command. He told me "he could not fire upon the town and so sacrifice thousands of innocent lives unless it became imperative for him to do so, and so he resorted to gentler means in taking possession of Manila."

The European residents were subject to intense anxiety. All were on the shortest possible rations. The British Consul, Mr. Walker, was seized with an illness, owing to lack of proper nutriment, and shortly afterwards died. All through this trying period, Admiral Dewey behaved both kindly and humanely to all the European residents. He assured our consul before his death, that the Americans would not bombard the town without giving the British residents twenty-four hours' notice.

The commanders of all English and other foreign vessels, except the German, respected and admired the Admiral, who never failed, when provisions were short, to provide for the needs of all officers on the neighbouring men-of-war ships.

CHAPTER V

Aguinaldo invited to fight for the Americans — Promises of Independence — Proceeds to Cavite on board an American Warship — Negotiations with Aguinaldo — Hon. Edward Spencer Pratt communicates with his Government — His Defence — Quotations from the *Temps* — Aguinaldo armed by the Americans — His Victorious Campaign — Admiral Dewey's Position — General Merritt's Arrival — His Proclamation — Cables between Admiral Dewey and Washington — Aguinaldo's Flag saluted — American Soldiers instructed to salute Filipino Officers — Aguinaldo's Treatment of Prisoners

AT the commencement of the war, America declared that it was neither her intention nor her desire to annex the colonies of Spain, nor to extend her interests in the East or West; but that she was compelled to assist and protect a weak and an oppressed people who were being daily tortured and murdered on the very threshold, as it were, of her republic, by the tyrannical, disorganised, and fast-disappearing government of Spain.

Admiral Dewey having regard to these intentions, when at Hong Kong both before

and after the declaration of war, and before he sailed for Manila, had to solve the problem of how he could best carry out his instructions to destroy the Spanish fleet and to bring matters to a successful issue in the islands, with the least possible loss of life.

Admiral Dewey, although in command of the fleet, had no men whom he could land at Manila, if circumstances required it, and negotiations were consequently commenced between himself and General Aguinaldo, with the view of inducing Aguinaldo to return to Cavite, and there take the command of the insurgent forces against the Spaniards.

This policy has recently been condemned in America, and the Hon. Edward Spencer Pratt, American Consul General at Singapore, has been punished for the part he took in carrying out the scheme.

Yet the truth of history shows that the taking of General Aguinaldo to Luzon was a clever strategical move, and would have brought about a peaceful termination of an honourable war, had not the American government changed its policy and abandoned all its previous assurances not to annex or to extend its interests in the East or the West.

Before the declaration of war, and while Admiral Dewey was at Hong Kong, and before the Hon. Edward S. Pratt had seen Gen-

eral Aguinaldo, Admiral Dewey "sent one of the captains ashore upon three different occasions to endeavour to make arrangements and terms with the Filipino leaders then residing in Hong Kong. This officer, who was dressed in civilian's clothes, was suspected of being a Spanish spy, and his overtures were rejected by the Filipinos."

I have quoted the above from a small but important pamphlet, "America's Transgressions in the Philippines," written by Mr. A. H. Myers, an American special correspondent, representing many American journals at Shanghai.

In consequence of certain statements made in the press at Hong Kong and elsewhere, Mr. Myers went to Manila; he personally investigated them, and discovered that what had been written was true. In the pamphlet to which I have referred, he placed before the European public in the East, the facts of America's transgressions, in order to prevent the Chinese press from giving garbled and exaggerated reports of his people's doings in the Philippines. His statements have never been contradicted or refuted by either the Americans or others in the East, who were aware of the condition of Manila at this time.

The Filipino junta at Hong Kong, ever suspicious of the Spanish people, were more so,

at this time, on account of a treaty made the year before between the Governor General of the Philippines at Manila, acting for the Spanish government, and General Aguinaldo, acting on behalf of the Filipino people. Under this treaty it was agreed that in consideration of Aguinaldo and forty-two of his leaders withdrawing from the Philippine Islands, they should be paid the sum of eight hundred thousand Mexican dollars (eighty thousand pounds), and that they should have granted to them the concessions they required for the Filipino nation. Four hundred thousand dollars (forty thousand pounds) were paid on the execution of the treaty, two hundred thousand dollars were to be paid in May, 1898, and two hundred thousand dollars in August of the same year.

General Aguinaldo has been condemned by the Spaniards, the Americans, and other foreigners at Manila for having accepted these terms. He has been considered by his critics as a traitor to his people, and a man without honour, who could be bought. But this opinion has only been formed by those who are ignorant of the man and of his character.

The reasons which induced him to enter into this treaty, and put an end to the war which he was then waging against the Spaniards in Luzon, *was the promise that the concessions*

which he required for his people would be granted.) Of the four hundred thousand dollars paid, two hundred thousand were deposited in the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank on the 3d of January, 1898, upon a fixed deposit for one year, and two hundred thousand dollars were paid into the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China, at Hong Kong.

Señor Buencamino, one of General Aguinaldo's chief supporters, told me that such trust had they in Aguinaldo's honour and integrity that they desired the money should be deposited in Aguinaldo's own name. He also said that much as Aguinaldo required the money in his self-imposed exile, he did not draw for his own use a single cent of the deposited money.

Another reason which induced General Aguinaldo to accept the treaty, was that his soldiers were practically without arms and ammunition, and they therefore could not have carried on the war for any great length of time. They did not expect the Spaniards would fulfil the treaty, and grant the concessions agreed, in which event the money would be forthcoming for the purchase of arms and ammunition which they so much needed. If the concessions were granted as was arranged, the Filipino people would have no further cause for complaint, and the money paid by the Spaniards was to be divided among those patriotic Filipinos whose

lands had been seized and confiscated by the Spaniards.

It is needless to say that the Spaniards did not fulfil the treaty, nor did they pay the balance of the money agreed. They did not grant the concessions, and, therefore, when the Filipino junta at Hong Kong was approached as above mentioned, they were naturally suspicious because they had then decided to continue the war in the Philippines against the Spaniards as soon as the Americans had completed their campaign.

The result of subsequent meetings and negotiations between Admiral Dewey's emissaries and the Filipino junta was that it was decided by the latter to send two representatives, viz., Señors Sandico and Alejandrino to visit Admiral Dewey on his flagship the *Olympia*.

Mr. A. H. Myers says in his "America's Transgressions in the Philippines": —

"I am informed that Dewey said to them he wanted Aguinaldo and the other Filipinos to go to the Philippine Islands, induce the natives to rise in rebellion against the Spaniards, and coöperate with the American forces to fight Spain. The Filipino representatives stated at the time that they had no arms, and Admiral Dewey replied that the American government would furnish them with all the arms and

ammunition that they would require. The question was then asked, 'What will be our reward?' and Dewey replied, 'I have no authority; but there is no doubt if you coöperate with and assist us by fighting the common enemy, that you will be granted your freedom the same as the Cubans will be.'"

The Hon. Edward S. Pratt, United States Consul General, was then communicated with at Singapore as to the whereabouts of General Aguinaldo in that town.

The *Singapore Free Press*, dated February 21, 1899, states that "when Mr. Pratt learned through us that General Aguinaldo was in Singapore, he very properly reported the matter to Admiral Dewey, asking for instructions. Admiral Dewey directed Mr. Pratt to invite General Aguinaldo to proceed to Hong Kong to confer with them. General Aguinaldo did so at his own expense. Therein Mr. Pratt did his bare duty to his government."

When I had the pleasure of seeing Mr. Pratt in April last at Singapore, he told me that his government had recalled him from his position as United States Consul General, in consequence of the part he took in sending Aguinaldo to the Philippines, and he added: "I did not send General Aguinaldo to Dewey, then Commodore Dewey, until he sent word to me that he

wanted Aguinaldo to come. I was in no sense a party to any of the arrangements reputed to have been made between Aguinaldo and the American government or its representatives, and on the departure of Aguinaldo for Hong Kong I duly notified my government of the fact."

The American government doubtless found it necessary to cast the blame of subsequent events upon some person in Hong Kong, Singapore, or the Philippines, and the scapegoat chosen was to bear the burden of this vacillation and change of policy. It seems eminently unfair that Mr. Pratt, one of the most intelligent consuls in the American service, and socially one of the most respected men in the East, should have his position taken from him for a mistake which he did not commit. Before injustice such as this is done, and before an innocent government servant is sacrificed, the files of letters and cables both on board the *Olympia* and at the American consulate at Singapore should be carefully considered and made public for the enlightenment of the American people.

At Hong Kong General Aguinaldo was introduced to the representative of Admiral Dewey. The *Manila Times* of March 20, 1899, which could publish nothing that was not approved by the American censor, says in a quotation

from the Paris *Temps*, which inserted a letter from its Manila correspondent: —

"It is clear to all of us who live here, European, creoles, and natives, that we are not approaching a peaceful denouement which the surrender of Manila led us to expect, but a situation that threatens to deluge the Philippine archipelago in blood. Commodore Dewey authorised a conference on April 25th with Aguinaldo and Isadore Santos, representing the Spanish Filipinos and Spanish half-breeds, and concluded an agreement in the following clauses: —

"'(1) The independence of the Philippines shall be proclaimed.

"'(2) There shall be established a centralised republic, with a government whose members are to be provisionally appointed by Don Emilio Aguinaldo.

"'(3) This government is to recognise a temporary intervention by American and European commissioners to be appointed by Commodore Dewey.

"'(4) The American protectorate is to be established under the same terms and conditions as it is accepted in Cuba.

"'(5) The ports of the Philippines will be open to the commerce of the whole world.

"'(6) Measures will be taken regarding

Chinese immigration in order that it should not injure native labour.

"'(7) The administration of justice will be reformed and pending these reforms, it will be in the hands of competent European judges.

"'(8) Liberty of the press and of association will be proclaimed.

"'(9) The same applies to religious freedom.

"'(10) The working of the mineral resources of the archipelago will be regulated.

"'(11) To facilitate the development of public wealth, new roads will be opened and the construction of railways encouraged.

"'(12) The impediments now placed to the formation of industrial enterprises and the taxes imposed upon foreign capital will be removed.

"'(13) The new government undertakes the duty of maintaining order and preventing any reprisals.'"

At that time it is certain that America had no desire to annex the Philippine Islands, and therefore it was but natural Admiral Dewey should promise Aguinaldo, that he would advise his government to grant independence to the Filipino nation.

Aguinaldo was clearly led to believe that such advice would be followed without question by the American government, and he therefore

went with his followers to Cavite on board the United States warship *McCulloch*, which was placed at his disposal by Admiral Dewey.

Immediately upon his arrival Aguinaldo was hailed by the Filipino nation as its leader and the negotiator for its people's independence. His army was ready to his hand waiting for him to lead it. In these circumstances, *Admiral Dewey gave Aguinaldo arms and ammunition.*

The Filipino general then commenced his campaign against the Spaniards, and drove them from all parts of Cavite and from the interiors of other provinces into the walled city of Manila. Town after town along his line of march fell to this remarkable man.

The island of Luzon was swept by the soldiers of Aguinaldo, and all the Spaniards who were not taken prisoners were driven into Manila. Aguinaldo thus cleared the island of Luzon of all Spaniards. Having them practically prisoners in Manila, with the sea and Dewey's fleet to face in the front, and Aguinaldo with his victorious forces in the rear, the Spaniards had to wait the decision of the American government.

Dewey received no assistance from America until the 30th of June, when three thousand men arrived escorted by the United States cruiser *Charleston*. Although the Admiral had carried out and complied with his instructions on the

1st of May, had Aguinaldo not assisted him and been successful in his campaign the Spaniards would still have been in possession of the island of Luzon, on the arrival of the land forces, and the Americans would have been compelled in taking Manila to destroy one of the finest cities in the Eastern world, to sacrifice the lives of people of all nationalities residing in or near the city, with the sole result of forcing Spaniards into the interior.

The Filipino general, in driving the Spaniards into the city from the interior, claims that he thus enabled America to end the war, as there was no other apparent object on her part than the defeat of the Spaniards and the capture of their Eastern capital.

He and his followers were most enthusiastic as to the result of their combined action with the Americans. When it was suggested by the less sanguine of the Filipinos that the Americans would not fulfil their promises of independence, their officers joyfully pointed to the city walls of Cavite on which had been posted the order of the day, numbered three, and issued by General Merritt, the then commander of the United States land forces. They said, "this is the corroboration of the promises that have been made to us and the justification of our hopes of future independence." The order referred to is as follows: —

"The American people do not come here to make war upon any party. It proclaims itself merely the champion, the liberator of people oppressed by a bad government of Spaniards."

Thus encouraged by General Merritt, the Filipinos continued their victorious campaign. The results were characterised by Admiral Dewey in his despatches as "wonderful."

Rumours of Aguinaldo's successes reached the government at Washington. In the correspondence between Secretary Long and Admiral Dewey, we find on the 26th of May, 1898, a despatch cautioning Dewey "from entering into any engagement with the insurgents which would render this government liable to further their cause." This cable was obviously late, inasmuch as Aguinaldo had, as we have seen already, been induced to take up arms in the American cause. Four days later a cable was sent by Dewey announcing a visit of Aguinaldo to the *Olympia*, and further announcing his intention to attack Manila on the 31st of May, 1898. In this despatch Dewey expressed some doubt of his ability to succeed.

On June 13, 1898, the following cable was sent: —

"*To the Secretary of the Navy, Washington:*

"Receipt of cablegram May 26th is acknowledged, and I thank the department for the ex-

pression of confidence. I have acted according to the *spirit of the department's instructions* therein from the beginning, and I have entered into no alliance with the insurgents or any faction. This squadron can reduce the defences of Manila at any moment, but it is considered useless until the arrival of sufficient forces to retain possession.

"DEWEY."

What was meant by "the spirit of the department's instructions"? Was it intended to take Aguinaldo to fight the Spaniards in the Philippines for the Americans on certain conditions, and then to discard him with those conditions broken? On June 14th Secretary Long cabled to Dewey: "Report fully any conferences, relations, or coöperations, military or otherwise, which you have had with Aguinaldo, and keep informed the department in that respect."

On June 27th Dewey replied:—

"Receipt of telegram of June 11th acknowledged. Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, with thirteen of his staff *arrived May 19th by permission. He established himself at Cavite outside arsenal, under protection of our guns, and organised his army.* I have had several conferences with him, generally of a personal nature. Con-

sistently, I have refrained from *assisting* him in any way with the force under my command, and on several occasions I have declined requests that I should do so, telling him the squadron could not act *until* the arrival of the United States troops. At the same time I consider insurgents as friends being opposed to a common enemy. He has gone to attend the meeting of insurgent leaders for the purpose of forming a civil government. Aguinaldo has acted independently of the squadron, but has kept *me advised* of his progress, which has been wonderful. I have allowed him to pass, by water, recruits, arms, and ammunition from the arsenal as he needed. Have advised him frequently to conduct the war humanely, which he has done invariably. My relations with him are cordial, but I am not in his confidence. The United States have not been bound in any way to assist insurgents by any act or promises, and he is not to my knowledge committed to assist us. I believe he expects to capture Manila without any assistance, but doubt ability, they not yet having many guns. IN MY OPINION THESE PEOPLE ARE FAR SUPERIOR IN THEIR INTELLIGENCE, AND MORE CAPABLE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT THAN THE NATIVES OF CUBA, AND I AM FAMILIAR WITH BOTH RACES."

The ambiguities contained in this cable cannot be passed without some comment. Admiral Dewey, in following "the spirit of the department's instructions," admits that Aguinaldo arrived on May the 19th *by permission*, but he omits to say "*by invitation.*" This may perhaps be natural, because he knew that Consul General Pratt at Singapore had notified the government at Washington "on the departure of Aguinaldo for Hong Kong," and therefore they knew, or should have known, the conditions under which Aguinaldo had returned to the Philippines. Dewey tells the government "Aguinaldo has established himself, etc., under the protection of our guns." If he were a traitor, to be hunted and condemned, why afford him the protection of American guns and the facilities for landing his "recruits, arms, and ammunition"? Yet Dewey says he had declined to assist him with the squadron until the arrival of the American troops. When Aguinaldo was invited to the Philippines, there was no suggestion that America intended to send troops there, nor did Dewey believe they would be needed. Aguinaldo thought he had the right to demand from Dewey the assistance of his fleet, remembering they had joined hands and forces to destroy the Spanish power, and that he had been employed to do so by American representatives in the East.

In one part of Admiral Dewey's cable he informs Secretary Long, "I am not in his confidence"; yet in a previous part he says, "but he has kept me advised of his progress, which is wonderful." The Americans encouraged Aguinaldo, and they continued to encourage him all through his campaign.

If after Aguinaldo's arrival in the Philippines, his actions had been opposed to American interests, and if it had been within "the spirit of the department's instructions" to Dewey, to regret the course that had been taken and the promises that had been made, why did not the American government at that time condemn Aguinaldo as "a rebel," as an enemy, and as a man otherwise acting in every way contrary to American instructions and American policy?

Secretary Long, on June 14th, merely inquired into the relations which existed between Dewey and Aguinaldo. There can be no question that he was fully aware of every interview that had taken place between the American officer and the Filipino leader. Dewey, in one of his cables, says that America has not been pledged by "any act or promises." Was not America pledged when Aguinaldo, either directly or by implication, was promised the independence of his people if he would return to the Philippines? Was not

America pledged when her representative gave arms to Aguinaldo for himself and his followers? Was not America pledged by the fact that he was continuing her war, and was himself conquering her enemy? And, further, was she not pledged by acquiescing in the formation of Aguinaldo's civil government, as evidenced by Dewey's cable to Secretary Long? Was not that the time for the American government to have called upon Aguinaldo to desist from further usurping American rights and powers obtained in and under her conquest of Spain?

The American admiral in command of the fleet permitted Aguinaldo to fight the Spaniards both on land and water, and to take from them every steam launch that he could capture; and he was further permitted to take Spanish prisoners and to hold them as such. I have been told by Europeans in Manila that when Aguinaldo passed the *Olympia* in his launch, there was a mutual salute. Aguinaldo's flag was admittedly the *flag of the Filipino republic.*

No instructions were given to him to lower it and to hoist in its stead the American stars and stripes; on the contrary, the Filipino flag was recognised and respected not only by the Americans, but also by all the foreign navies then anchored in the bay.

The Filipinos were authorised to send their

launches and small boats into Subig Bay, to attack the town of Subig. There they were met by the German warship *Irene*, whose commander forbade them to attack, and, if they failed to obey, threatened to fire upon them. The Filipinos returned to Dewey, informing him of what had taken place, and he sent to assist them in the taking of Subig the U.S.S. *Raleigh* and *Concord*, the commanders of which were instructed to take the town and leave it in the hands of the Filipinos. Two shells were fired by these warships, and the white flag was quickly shown. The town surrendered conditionally upon its not being left to the mercy of Aguinaldo and his army. The commanders of the *Raleigh* and *Concord* returned to Admiral Dewey for further instructions, and they were told "to obey orders." The Filipinos were then permitted to take Subig, with its prisoners, its arms, and its ammunition. Was not America by this act pledged to the Filipino people and to their cause?

Admiral Dewey on the 27th of June was of the opinion, and I believe is still, that these deceived Filipinos were, and are, entitled to the liberty and independence for which they have fought so bravely and so long, and which they have so richly earned. In his cable, he recommends the Filipinos as men worthy of the rights of men, capable and fitted to govern

and to control their affairs. The Cabinet at Washington should alone bear the shame of their policy of aggression and deception. These bureaucrats believed they could form a better opinion of the abilities of the Filipino race than Admiral Dewey with all his experience, local knowledge, and observation.

Had the affairs of the Philippines been left by the officials at Washington in the hands of this very able and honourable man, the question now in dispute would long since have been settled without American loss of life or prestige.

Aguinaldo has been much abused for the treatment of his prisoners. He has been charged with having committed every form of atrocity and cruelty; but those who have known him, his generals, and his people, know such accusations to be absolutely without foundation. I have myself seen how well his prisoners have been treated in different parts of Luzon, but I think it wiser to quote on this subject the American *Washington Post* of February 2, 1899, referring to a journey made by Paymaster Wilcox and Cadet Sargent, both officers of Dewey's squadron, through the island of Luzon, unknown to the Filipino government.

"In the villages Humingan and Lupao there are a few Spanish prisoners, priests, soldiers,

and civil officials. We have seen representatives of each of these three classes in these towns. We could detect no signs of ill treatment nor of undue restriction. On the contrary, they appeared to possess the freedom of the towns in which they lived.

"At Aparri there were many Spanish prisoners, civil officers, priests, and soldiers. Eighty-four priests were paraded in the street for our inspection, only four or five of them wearing robes of their office. Nearly all of them wore long hair and beards. They appeared in good health; one could detect no evidence of maltreatment. These prisoners had been assembled from various parts of the province. They are kept under stricter guard than either of the other two classes of prisoners, for the reason that the native officials fear that if permitted to go among the people, they will use the influence they possess through their position in the church to excite them against the Filipino government. We also met Don José Perez, a Spaniard who had been previously governor of the province. He was well dressed, and seemed to be enjoying all the ordinary comforts."

CHAPTER VI

THE SURRENDER OF MANILA

General Merritt instructed by his Government to repudiate Filipinos, yet accepts their Coöperation — Merritt orders Filipinos to evacuate Trenches — Attack and Retreat of the Americans from Fort San Antonio — Guns abandoned, recaptured by the Filipinos — Attack on Spaniards by Filipinos continued and sanctioned by General Merritt — Conditions of Manila during Siege — Capture of Manila — Unnecessary sacrifice of Men — Aguinaldo's Action in the taking of Manila — A Commission agrees to Terms of Capitulation — Five Thousand Spaniards taken Prisoners — Aguinaldo's Offer to disarm on Special Terms — American Indifference

Up to the time of the arrival of General Merritt there was complete harmony and a thorough understanding and coöperation between the Americans and the Filipinos, but on his arrival the relations were entirely changed. He alleged that his instructions from his government were to avoid the Filipinos, and to take no part in their actions or their cause. Yet

instructions were given to the American soldiers to salute Filipino officers as they would salute their own, and in proof of this statement an American officer who was attached to an American general subsequently admitted this to have been true, but added, "How could you expect American soldiers to salute Filipino officers when they are careless about saluting their own?"

General Merritt still permitted the Filipinos to engage the Spaniards and to defeat them in all parts of the outskirts of Manila and to drive them into the city walls; and later he reaped the benefit of these services which he repaid, as will be shown, by a deliberate system of insult and persecution.

Instead of temporising and explaining the position of affairs to the Filipinos, or giving them the assurances that their past services would be recognised in some shape or form, he apparently thought that his proper course of action was to ignore them entirely, refuse all overtures from them, and, in fact, as later events will demonstrate, humiliate and abuse them. Up to this time the campaign in the Philippines had not cost the United States one single life. The first loss on the American side occurred during the night attack of August, which was really an unnecessary sacrifice.

General Merritt thought that he could in-

spire the insurgents with a terror of his volunteers' ability to fight, forgetting (or being ignorant of the fact) that fear is unknown to the Filipino race. They had subdued and terrified the Spanish by their repeated victories and still more repeated onslaughts, but General Merritt desired unnecessarily to attack the Spaniards, though they were entirely under the control of the Filipinos.

As Mr. A. H. Meyers says:—

"For evident reasons the Spaniards had a mortal dread of the Filipinos, and all the fighting was a running one. In the advance line of trenches were ever the Filipinos, and at the back of them the Americans. To satisfy a thirst for glory the Filipinos were ordered to evacuate the line of trenches which they had constructed and held, and against which the Spaniards had attempted no attack. But as soon as the Americans occupied these trenches, the Spaniards set to work and tried to carry the position with the result that many Americans will never return to their native land."

I was informed by a prominent Filipino general at Malolos that, on July 31, 1898, the Americans attacked the old fort of San Antonio, then in the possession of the Spaniards at Manila. They were, however, forced

to retreat before the heavy fire of the Spaniards into the village of Paranaque, which was well out of the range of the Spanish guns. So hurried, my Filipino informant told me, was the retreat that American guns and ammunition were abandoned. These were recaptured by the Filipinos and returned by them to the Americans. This statement was also corroborated by the Europeans in Manila.

If such was the case, it is not perhaps so surprising, when we remember that these American soldiers were possibly undergoing their baptism of fire. Later, however, as I shall show, they were brave and daring, fighting fiercely for their own honour and their country's cause, whether right or wrong.

Through the months of June and July, the Spaniards were attacked, harassed, and worried by the Filipinos, who frequently, in order to avoid unnecessary waste of ammunition, fired crackers close to the Spanish outposts, in order to terrify and alarm them. This was an old habit of the Filipinos during the revolution before the American war with Spain. Great anxiety existed in the Spanish lines. Manila had become a city of dread, poverty, almost of starvation, and isolated entirely, by reason of all railway and telegraphic communication having been cut off by the Filipinos. Bread could not be obtained because the stock of flour had

been exhausted, and cattle were not to be had. The inhabitants were therefore compelled to eat the carabaos (buffaloes used for cart work), or horse flesh. Sickness and disease prevailed among the Spanish soldiers to an alarming extent, and European ladies, who had not left Manila previously, were compelled to take refuge on vessels in the harbour.

This was the condition of Manila on the 13th of August when the city surrendered to Admiral Dewey and to General Merritt, under, it is reported, an agreement made between them and the Spanish governor.

The Archbishop of Manila told me, and it was generally admitted by the British and foreign inhabitants, that the capture of the city was one of the most disgraceful farces in the history of modern warfare. The relatives of the thirty-two unfortunate men who were literally butchered in this prearranged opera bouffe performance should demand, through their congressmen, an investigation. An understanding existed between the American and Spanish generals so complete in its details that a certain building with a red roof had been designated upon which the white flag was to be hoisted. The infamy of this whole proceeding needs no further denunciation than the mere statement of these facts.

It was agreed that a few volleys should be

fired by the soldiers, and a few shells by the American ships. In the carrying out these arrangements all that was necessary was for the soldiers to lie in the trenches, and wait events. When the white flag was hoisted, they could have proceeded into the city of Manila with bands playing, and so have accomplished their work without the sacrifice of a single life; but certain officers desiring glory and promotion, and believing it necessary in the taking of Manila that somebody must be killed, orders were miscarried or were never given, and men were fighting in real earnest. The American left wing received their orders according to prearrangement, for they advanced without precaution on the supposed hostile lines to the music of "There will be a Hot Time in the Old Town To-night"; whilst the men on the right found themselves mixed up in actual battle. The men of the Astor battery were especially unfortunate, for when the order to "charge" came, they had nothing but revolvers in their hands.

The American story told of this fight was different, it being given to the world as a victory by the Americans after a determined struggle by the Spaniards. Out of thirty soldiers of the Cazadores, commanded by Captain Miranda and Lieutenant Pola, which garrisoned Fort San Antonio, twenty-three were killed and the remaining seven were wounded

by the shells from the American fleet, and a further one hundred men from San Antonio Abad and Santa Ana were killed.

General Aguinaldo, speaking of the attack on Manila, says: "In this I took a very active part. Although I was not notified, my forces from the port of Cavite were extended all round the suburbs of Malate, Ermita, Sampaloc, and Tondo. In spite of all these services although the Spaniards would never have surrendered if my forces had not closed every road of retreat into the interior, the American generals not merely left me out entirely in the terms of capitulation, but even asked me to withdraw my forces from Cavite and the suburbs of Manila."

The first intimation received by Aguinaldo of the intention of America to take Manila was on the request of an American officer that the Filipino army should withdraw and permit the American soldiers to pass into the city. This the Filipinos immediately did, and the Americans were then ordered to stand with fixed bayonets to prevent them from returning to their former positions. This was a dangerous insult to offer to twelve thousand brave and well-armed men.

The attack on Manila commenced at 6.30 A.M., the flag of truce was raised at 10.30 A.M., and the Americans entered the city.

The morning following, a commission met to discuss terms of capitulation. That commission was composed of Judge Advocate General Don Nicolas de la Peña, Colonel of the Staff Don José Olaguer, Colonel of Engineers Don Carlos Reyes, Brigadier General F. V. Greene, Lieutenant Charles Whittier, Lieutenant Colonel and Judge Advocate E. H. Crowder, Captain Lamberton, Commander of the Flagship *Olympia*, when the following treaty of surrender was agreed: —

"MANILA, August 14, 1898.

"The undersigned having been appointed a commission to determine the details of the capitulation of the city and defences of Manila and its suburbs, and the Spanish forces stationed therein in accordance with the agreement entered into the previous day by Major General Wesley Merritt, United States Army, American Commander in Chief in the Philippines, and his Excellency Don Fermin Jaudenes, acting General in Chief of the Spanish army in the Philippines

"HAVE AGREED UPON THE FOLLOWING

"1. The Spanish troops, European and native, capitulate with the city and defences with all the honours of war, depositing their

arms in the places designated by the authorities of the United States, and remaining in the quarters designated, and under the orders of their officers, and subject to control of the aforesaid United States authorities, until the conclusion of a treaty of peace between the two belligerent nations.

"All persons in the capitulation remain at liberty, the officers remaining in their respective homes, which shall be respected as long as they observe the regulations prescribed for their government and the laws in force.

"2. Officers shall retain their side arms, horses, and private property.

"3. All public horses and public property of all kinds shall be turned over to staff officers designated by the United States.

"4. Complete returns in duplicate of men by organisations, and full list of public property and stores, shall be rendered to the United States within ten days from this date.

"5. All questions relating to repatriation of officers and men of the Spanish forces, and of their families and of expenses which said repatriation may occasion, shall be referred to the government of the United States at Washington.

"Spanish families may leave Manila at any time convenient to them.

"The return of the arms surrendered by the

Spanish forces shall take place when they evacuate the city, or when the American army evacuates.

"6. Officers and men included in the capitulation shall be supplied by the United States, according to their rank, with rations and necessary aid as though they were prisoners of war, until the conclusion of a treaty of peace between the United States and Spain.

"All the funds in the Spanish treasury, and all other public funds shall be turned over to the authorities of the United States.

"7. This city, its inhabitants, its churches, and religious worship, its educational establishments, and its private property of all descriptions are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honour of the American army."

Under this arrangement the Americans were in possession of some five thousand prisoners, who were quartered in the churches and other public buildings within the old walled city.

In clause five of the above treaty the Americans agreed to return the captured arms to the Spaniards when either of the forces vacated the city. It is well known in Manila that Aguinaldo offered to disarm and to withdraw his troops from the positions they then held, if the Americans would undertake not to return the arms and ammunition to the Spaniards.

Aguinaldo expected that America would vacate the Philippine Islands upon the completion of the war, and in that event he and his people would have been left again to the mercy of the Spaniards. He, therefore, naturally desired that they should not have their arms returned to them. He received no reply to his most urgent inquiries and requests on this subject, and consequently he was compelled to support a standing army, together with the prisoners he had taken in his wars. The Filipino exchequer was well-nigh exhausted, and his soldiers desired to return to their homes and to their peaceful employments.

All through the siege of Manila, the Filipinos had behaved with the utmost kindliness to the British, both in Manila and within their own lines in the interior.

Mr. Clark, manager of Messrs. Smith, Bell & Co.'s rice mills at Bayembang, some seventy miles distant from Manila, was provided with provisions and afforded every possible protection from the bravadoes then frequenting the provinces; and to his credit, and to the credit of the Filipinos, it must be said that his mill continued its business and was worked by Filipino employees. Mr. Higgins, the general manager of the railway in Luzon, who resided within the rebel lines all through the trouble, praises in the most unqualified

terms the forbearance and generosity of the Filipinos, who, when they needed private property in the cause they were prosecuting, paid for all they acquired, and treated the English with the greatest kindness and respect, whilst the Spaniards both seized and destroyed private property without offering payment of any sort.

Referring to the surrender of Manila and the subsequent proceedings taken in Spain, the London *Globe* in its Madrid despatch of August 5th, 1899, publishes the following:—

"The public prosecutor has, after a long investigation into the case of the surrender of Manila, presented his professional findings. He demands the imprisonment for life, and dismissal from the service, of the officers responsible for the surrender. The public trial of General Jaudenes will take place on September 1st."

CHAPTER VII

General Merritt's Proclamation — Further American Government Cables to Dewey — Arrival of General Otis — Departure of General Merritt for Paris Conference — His Views of the Filipinos — His Corroboration of Aguinaldo's Wrongs — Señor Agoncillo's reply to General Merritt's Statements

AFTER the capture of Manila, Admiral Dewey required instructions from his government regarding the request of the "insurgents" to be allowed to enter the city, and General Merritt issued the following proclamation: —

"HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
"August 14th, 1898.

"*To the People of the Philippines:*

"1. War has existed between the United States and Spain since April 21st of this year. Since that date you have witnessed the destruction by an American fleet of the Spanish naval power in these islands, the fall of the principal city Manila and its defences, and the surrender of the Spanish army of occupation to the forces of the United States.

"2. The commander of the United States forces now in possession has instructions from his government to assure the people that he has not come to wage war upon them, nor upon any party or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who by active aid or honest submission coöperate with the United States in its efforts to give effect to this beneficent purpose, will receive the reward of its support and protection.

"3. The government established among you by the United States army is a government of military occupation, and for the present it is ordered that the municipal laws, such as affect private rights of persons and property, regulate local institutions, and provide for the punishment of crime, shall be considered as continuing in force, so far as compatible with the purposes of military government, and that they be administered through the ordinary tribunals substantially as before occupation, but by officials appointed by the government of occupation.

"4. A provost-marshal general will be appointed for the city of Manila and its outlying district. This territory will be divided into subdistricts, and there will be assigned to each a deputy provost-marshal.

"The duties of the provost-marshal general and his deputies will be set forth in detail in

future orders. In a general way, they are charged with the duty of making arrests of military as well as civil offenders, sending such of the former class as are triable by courts martial to their proper commands, with statements of their offences and names of witnesses, and detaining in custody all other offenders for trial by military commission, provost courts, or native criminal courts in accordance with law and the instructions hereafter to be issued.

"5. The port of Manila and all other ports and places in the Philippines which may be in the actual possession of our land and naval forces will be open while our military occupation may continue, to the commerce of neutral nations as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war and upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at the time of importation.

"6. All churches and places devoted to religious worship and to the arts and sciences, and all educational institutions, libraries, scientific collections, museums, are, so far as possible, to be protected, and all destruction or intentional defacement of such places or property, of historical monuments, archives, or works of science, is prohibited save when required by urgent military necessity — severe punishment will be meted out for all violations of this regulation.

"The custodians of all properties of the

character mentioned in this section will make prompt returns thereof to these headquarters, stating character, and location, and embodying such recommendations as they may think proper for the full protection of the properties under their care and custody, that proper orders may issue enjoining the coöperation of both military and civil authorities in securing such protection.

"7. The commanding general, in announcing the establishment of military government, and in entering upon his duties as military governor in pursuance of his appointment as such by the government of the United States, desires to assure the people that so long as they preserve the peace, and perform their duties toward the representative of the United States, they will not be disturbed in their persons and property, except in so far as may be found necessary for the good of the service of the United States and the benefit of the people of the Philippines.

"(Signed) WESLEY MERRITT.

"*Major General United States Army commanding.*"

In this proclamation, the Filipinos failed to recognise the cloven hoof which later was to destroy them. They believed in the truth of General Merritt's public announcement upon

the walls of Cavite "that the American people do not come to make war upon the Philippine people." They believed in the integrity and honesty of America as a great nation; but simple in their confidence they did not understand that the American government was changing its policy and compromising its people in order to exterminate their former Filipino allies. Difficult as it is to believe that this was so, there can be little question of its truth, for on August 19th, 1898, Acting Secretary Allen cabled to Admiral Dewey:—

"Answering your cable, the President answers as follows: There must be no joint occupation with insurgents. The United States in the possession of the city, bay, and harbour of Manila must preserve peace, protecting by military and naval forces. Insurgents and all others must recognise the military occupation and authority of the United States, and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed by the President. Use any means in your judgment necessary to this end. 'All law-abiding people must be treated alike.'"

By what reason, argument, or law could the term "insurgent" be justified? It is true the Filipinos had risen in revolt against the treatment of oppressive Spain; but their rela-

tions were different with America — they had been and still were her allies and her friends.

Yet in consequence of rumours having been circulated that the insurgents were continuing hostilities against the Spaniards within their own lines, the President of the United States, after consultation with the members of his Cabinet and with Acting Secretary Allen of the navy, determined, as far as possible, that they should cease, and a cablegram was accordingly sent to Dewey by Acting Secretary Allen, dated September 7th, 1898 : —

"By the direction of the President, you will exert your influence, during suspension of hostilities between the United States and Spain, to restrain insurgent hostilities toward Spaniards, and, while maintaining a position of rightful supremacy as to the insurgents, to pursue, so far as possible, a conciliatory course to all."

The course of action taken by the United States government was criminal, if only for its stupidity. The so-called insurgents, as has been shown, were anxious and willing to disarm. They merely desired, and properly so, some recognition and explanation as to the future policy of the American government, some grateful courtesy at the hands of those whom they had assisted in conquering the

enemy; and they had justly earned some consideration other than insults and the grossest ingratitude.

This was the general opinion of *all* persons in Manila, including the American soldiers and the American officers who repeatedly told me that they were unable to understand the government policy, or what was the course of action to be pursued.

Admiral Dewey did everything in his power to conciliate both Spaniards and Filipinos as far as "the spirit of the department's instructions" permitted. His position was most difficult and trying, and Aguinaldo well understood it, and at no time have I heard him blame Admiral Dewey, for whom he had the highest regard, and who, he believed, desired to carry through the original intention of the war, viz., the declaration of Philippine independence.

The Filipinos were as surprised as the British and other foreigners in Manila upon the arrival of contingent after contingent of United States soldiers — the reason for which none could understand, as the Spanish troops had been conquered, and her fleet had been destroyed, and the cause for the waging of war had entirely ceased. The Filipinos were friendly, awaiting only the peaceful dictates of the United States government, and therefore required no forces to keep them in subjection.

Major General Otis arrived on the 22nd of August, 1898, with some four thousand more American volunteer troops to relieve General Merritt, who had been ordered to Paris to act as one of the commissioners at the Paris conference. His opinion of the Filipinos at that time was decidedly favourable, for on the 2nd of October, 1898, on his arrival at Marseilles, on the steamship *Arcadia*, a correspondent of the *New York Herald* reported that General Merritt had said: —

"It is a pure falsehood, — the story spread by the Spanish and pro-Spanish press to the effect that the Filipino population is hard to govern, — in spite of misgovernment they are still quite tractable — they have been grossly misrepresented — the men are obedient and affectionate, the women deeply interested in their domestic duties. I did not meet Aguinaldo, but I was told before my arrival that he was troublesome and arrogant."

On the Monday following the above date, the same newspaper announced General Merritt's arrival in Paris, and reported as follows: —

"The Filipinos impress me very favourably. I think a great injustice has been done the native population. I have found the Filipinos

susceptible to good treatment, and I am certain they would always prove grateful in return for fair dealing. They are much superior in general points of character to the natives of kindred people in any other part of the world. They are more capable of self-government than, I think, the Cubans are. They are considered to be good Catholics. They have lawyers, and doctors, and men of kindred professions, who stand well in the community, and bear favourable comparison with those of other countries. They are dignified, courteous, and reserved." Later General Merritt appears to have altered his opinion, no doubt after he had heard of the American government's fickle policy, for the London *Morning Post* quotes him as saying:—

"It was impossible to recognise the insurgents. I made it a point not to do so, as I knew it would lead to complications. I think Admiral Dewey, after my arrival, pursued the same course. What was done before, is not a matter upon which I can comment. I purposely did not recognise Aguinaldo, nor his troops, nor did I use them in any way. Aguinaldo did not ask to see me until ten days after my arrival. After that I was too much occupied to see him. In talking to the leading Filipinos, I told them that the United States

had no promises to make, but that they might be assured that the government and the people of the United States would treat them fairly. This, because the United States was in the habit of dealing fairly with all struggling people, and not because I had been authorised to say anything of the kind. We purposely gave the insurgents no notice of the attack on Manila, because we did not need their coöperation. We were moved by the fear that they might loot, plunder, and possibly murder. Aguinaldo's men and subordinate leaders in conversing with the American officers would frequently say that they intended to cut the throats of all the Spaniards in Manila. Aguinaldo himself wrote a letter, complaining that the Filipinos had been denied their share of the booty. Whatever he may have meant by that, I took no notice of the letter."

Señor Agoncillo, the representative of the Filipino government, answered General Merritt in the following terms: —

"General Merritt does not deny the facts contained in the Filipino appeal, but on the contrary it may be gathered that this appeal is the natural outcome of his policy, which is similar to that observed toward the Filipinos by their late masters, the Spanish. I think that no impor-

tance ought really to be attached to the General's statements, because he confessed that he had not been authorised to say anything as to promises, nor as to the form of government to be established in the Philippines. General Merritt said that it was impossible to recognise the insurgents; but he confessed that Admiral Dewey pursued the same course only after General Merritt's arrival, which implies that recognition was made before from the fact of his declining to comment on it. The blame of such recognition he puts on the shoulders of Admiral Dewey, and nothing is forthcoming to show that President McKinley disapproved of the action of the latter. General Merritt boasts of his repeated refusal to receive General Aguinaldo, or to take any notice of his letters. Admiral Dewey constantly received General Aguinaldo on board his flagship with full military honours. General Anderson, commander of Cavite, attended the reception in the Royal Athenæum, and General Greene, during the voyage from Hong Kong to San Francisco on board the American transport *China*, treated me with the greatest consideration. He always allotted me the place of honour as the official and legal representative of the national government of the Philippine republic. Furthermore, President McKinley, attended by one of the under secretaries of

the foreign department, received me with every courtesy at the White House. In respect to General Merritt's statement, that he did not recognise either Aguinaldo or his troops, and that he purposely gave no notice of the attack on Manila, I may mention that Aguinaldo had previously to that established his government, and controlled the whole island of Luzon, without opposition from General Merritt. Indeed, on the contrary, the local American authorities entered into arrangements such as are accepted by the equity of nations between the authorities and officials of two different states. Perhaps General Merritt did not need the coöperation of the Filipino troops, but he forgets that Admiral Dewey supplied Aguinaldo, on the arrival of the latter at Cavite, with a hundred and fifty rifles to commence operations against the Spanish army; and that Aguinaldo was implored by the commander of the *Petrel*, by the consuls of Singapore, Hong Kong, and Manila, and by other officers who led the natives against the Spaniards in combination with the American forces, and with that object in view he, with seventeen of his staff, was taken from Hong Kong to Manila in an American transport. To pretend that the American army was solely responsible for the so-called conquest of Manila and Cavite, and to refuse the Filipino troops their

share of that work, is mean and unfair, and is not the truth."

Señor Agoncillo indignantly denies the suggestions of looting or outrages by the Filipinos. "Such accusations," he says, "are simply baseless." The first act of Admiral Dewey was to deliver to Aguinaldo the prisoners taken by the Americans in the battle of the bay of Manila. Before the arrival of General Merritt, the insurgents were in possession of the whole province of Cavite and a portion of Luzon. After his arrival, they continued their conquest, and secured victories both in Luzon and in Bisayas. Señor Agoncillo continues: —

"Although they now have in their possession fourteen thousand prisoners, they never loot, plunder, or murder any one; but, on the contrary, they have always strictly observed the rules of war, in accordance with the principles of modern civilisation, and never failed to do everything in accordance with humanitarian principles. General Merritt's honesty should debar him from attributing to General Aguinaldo, the loyal ally of America, a claim on the part of the Filipinos for a share of the booty. His reference to the Filipinos as children is a simple echo of the Spanish saying, and he, like the Spaniards, may discover his error too late. Now that the Spaniards are defeated, they are

convinced of the great historical mistake which caused the war carried on by Aguinaldo since 1896. The competence of the natives to govern finds full evidence in the present administration, and in the law, order, and morality which prevail in the districts now under control."

Thus Señor Agoncillo answered General Merritt's statements, point by point, and threw upon him the burden of proving his suggestions.

His allegations as to the Filipinos claiming a share of booty in connection with the taking of Manila were based upon secondary evidence. If he had received a letter, as he suggested, from General Aguinaldo, embodying those alleged claims of the Filipinos, why has he not published it? Further, supposing they had so claimed their share, would it have been unnatural, and what soldiers were better entitled than they who had taken so active and so prominent a part in defeating Spanish forces in the Philippines?

But can General Merritt reconcile his two statements?

In the first, he corroborates all that Admiral Dewey has said; and in the second, he corroborates Aguinaldo, and proves that the latter and his people have undoubtedly been misled.

The Filipino Martyrs

The *New York Herald* of December 29th, 1898, published the following: —

"Admiral Dewey considers it absolutely necessary that a first-class statesman be sent to Manila to thoroughly investigate the situation, and to ascertain the aspirations of the Filipino republicans." Here was the opinion of the only man competent to give one on the subject. He well understood it, having been in the Philippines from the commencement of the war, and having seen the principal and most important actions in the American and Spanish war in the East. Did the American government follow the advice of Dewey, and, if not, why not? The people of America should demand an answer, and that answer should be a reason, and not an excuse.

CHAPTER VIII

The American Occupation of Manila — Treatment of Prisoners — Attitude taken by General Otis — Cruel Treatment of the Filipinos — Newspapers attack Aguinaldo in their Articles — Repeated Scares — Filipinos ordered to withdraw from Manila — General Otis as a tactician

AFTER the fall of Manila, the Americans took up their positions in the city and commenced to govern Manila. General Otis naturally took possession of the late governor's house in San Miguel, and used the palace (Ayuntamiento) as the house of the executive power. The generals and other officers had allotted to them other vacant houses, and the ordinary volunteer soldiers were provided with such accommodation as was afforded in the cigar factories, cockpits, etc., some of them being compelled to camp in the open.

The Spanish prisoners were camped in the churches and monasteries, of which there are a great number. They undoubtedly received the greatest consideration and kindness from the Americans. During the early occupation

of Manila, the American military governor-general made each Spanish officer an allowance from which he had to provide for the wants and necessities of the men in the company he commanded; but it soon became apparent that the Spanish officers, instead of feeding their men, misappropriated the money to their own inhuman ends, and left their soldiers positively starving in the streets.

This atrocious conduct was quickly discovered by the Americans, who immediately discontinued the allowances. From that time the prisoners received their rations from the Americans at their quarters. I have frequently seen them fed, and have examined the food supplied to them. They each received a large bowl of hot meat, and potatoes soaked in a most appetising gravy. The quality and the quantity of their food was beyond reproach, and surprised the men themselves. Many of them have frequently told me that in their captivity they were happier than when free, half starving as soldiers in the Spanish army.

The Americans removed, necessarily, all Spaniards from public offices, and placed their own officials in charge of the customs, the postal and telegraph offices, etc. They dismissed also the Spaniards who had policed the city so well, and placed in their stead the raw recruits who had volunteered in the campaign.

This proved later to have been one of the many mistakes of the war, discovered only after America had announced her intention of annexation. The Spanish police corps was perhaps as good as any in the world. They were acquainted with the desperadoes and the dens they frequented in the town; they were accustomed to the local revolts and to the secret meetings of the insurgents; and they were skilful in their management of the traffic of the streets and of the people.

These men were willing to serve the Americans as they had served the Spaniards, and remembering they hated and feared the insurgents, there is every reason for supposing that they would have been faithful.

The United States volunteers were too inexperienced and too arrogant to cope with the large traffic of the streets, and too ignorant of the Filipino character to make themselves popular and respected, with the consequence that Manila has been, and is, the hotbed of theft and crime, of debauchery and assassination.

Scarcely had the Americans settled to their occupation before newspapers of all descriptions were published, and these papers unfortunately were permitted publicity, provided their attacks and abuse were confined to the Filipino or "insurgent" people. The officers governing

Manila allowed these organs to exercise their harmful influence uncontrolled, though a censor had been appointed to examine into and prevent opinions being expressed or reported which might damage American interests in Luzon.

Aguinaldo and his followers read daily the scurrilous and untruthful accounts of his army and his affairs; the attacks made upon him both as a general and a man; his alleged intention to attack the American people at Manila; his alleged cruel treatment of his prisoners, his policies, his treachery, until he wondered what manner of people this American nation could be.

On one occasion he said: "I have been loyal to America and the Americans. I have at all times acted upon their advice, complied with their desires, yet in their daily journals they endeavour to humiliate me before my people. They call me thief, renegade, traitor, for no reason. I have done them no harm; I have assisted them to their ends, and they now consider me their enemy. Why am I called a renegade, traitor, thief? They say that I have stolen the money paid me for my people. That money belonged to my followers, and if it is spent, it is they who have spent it upon our country and upon our independence. These journals, if America desires them to be so called, cannot change the opinions of my army;

they know I am honest, they know me to be their champion, and they trust me. Why has America altered her views of me, and why does she permit these newspapers to plant in the hearts of her soldiers anger and ill-feeling by their untruthful reports? This morning, it is alleged, I shall attack Manila to-morrow. Why? Because I wait merely for my independence and for the fulfilment of America's promises."

In order to show how easily the American soldiers were excited, in consequence of newspaper statements of Aguinaldo's intentions to attack Manila, I will mention an incident which took place in September, 1898, and which was the cause of much merriment in the Filipino camp.

A message was brought in hot haste from an American outpost, that a Filipino soldier had given thirty minutes' notice for the withdrawal of the American force at that point, with the alternative of immediate annihilation. Troops were hurried to the front, and a battle was reported imminent. The most absurd rumours were circulated throughout the city, people ran breathless to their cellars for protection, and the wildest possible excitement prevailed. When the Filipino camp was reached, which was commanded by Señor Sandico, it was found that the whole story was a pure invention. The women

were quietly washing their children, or were preparing their daily meal, or were otherwise employed in their domestic affairs; but they were in camp, which would not have been the case had there been any intention to attack Manila. The Filipinos were ignorant of the cause of the American commotion.

This condition of things was almost of daily occurrence. I have seen the American soldiers lash themselves into a state of fearful panic, without the smallest cause.

Collier's Weekly, October 29th, 1898, quoting a letter from its correspondent, dated September 10, 1898, says: —

"For some days there have been occurrences which every one feared would lead to trouble. A member of the Thirteenth Minnesota opened fire and killed a native. From that time the insurgents have been surly, and have *not* submitted to be searched with good grace."

I must here explain that the "insurgents" were permitted to enter Manila at will, provided they did not carry arms, and the soldiers received orders to search a suspected case.

One night some American soldiers knocked down a native and robbed him. No inquiries were made, and no one was punished for the dastardly offence. Insults and cruelties were

permitted, provided they were offered only to Filipinos. It is hardly necessary for me to say that the rumoured outbreaks never took place. The Filipinos neither threatened to take Manila nor did they fire upon the Americans, until the 4th of February, 1899, and then only under conditions which I shall describe in a subsequent chapter.

The newspapers to which I have referred were alone to blame for all the scares and panics caused in the American lines, and these "frights," on the American side, did not inspire the Filipinos with a great idea of their courage or their discretion, and consequently they had an erroneous opinion of them. The American generals permitted their men to be worked up by a few editors to such a condition of excitement as to amount almost to frenzy. These "journalists" in no sense understood the real situation, and had to resort to these practices for the daily sale of their papers.

The frequent calls to arms were the source of great amusement to the calm and collected Filipinos, who failed to understand such hysterical outbursts in a people reported to be brave and self-contained.

In consequence of these threatened "attacks" by the Filipinos, General Otis ordered the natives to vacate the quarters they then occupied, and to withdraw farther from the en-

virons of Manila and away from the lines of the American soldiers. No reason was assigned for these commands, but three days were given in which to obey them.

The order no doubt was a wise one, but at the same time a clever tactician would have stated the cause. He would have informed Aguinaldo that, owing to the rumoured threats of his people, Manila was becoming impossible and unbearable as a visiting place to himself and his soldiers, and, consequently, dangerous to both the American and Filipino armies.

The insurgents, patient and uncomplaining, left on the second day the homes in which they were located, and proceeded to erect their camps in the open, within the limits prescribed by General Otis; but few can realise what hardships and privations these changes meant to the Filipino people, in a season the worst in the year on account of the rains, and the diseases which the rainy months cause. Yet these soldiers, as desired, withdrew, with their banners flying.

Still the Manila press continued to sow the seeds of hatred in the hearts of the American soldiers, until they loathed the Filipinos. They insulted them on all possible occasions, and openly stated that the time would come when they would shoot them like dogs.

Scarcely were the Filipinos settled in their

new quarters, when a fresh order was issued, commanding them again to withdraw. It was reported to Otis that they had declined to do so. This was untrue. They were really endeavouring to find a suitable place in which to pitch their camp.

Aguinaldo sent a message to General Otis, saying that the American commander could not possibly understand the hardships which his orders inflicted upon the Filipino soldiers; he received no reply; yet he obeyed General Otis, and again removed the Filipino camp.

It is impossible to understand the intentions or motives of these hard and peremptory commands, unless, as it appeared, it was the desire of the Americans to force a war upon the Filipinos.

Finding Aguinaldo ever obedient, the Americans commenced a systematic ill treatment of the Filipinos on the sea. The latter were in the habit, as sanctioned by Dewey, of conveying their supplies to the places at which they had their troops stationed. Without warning, the Admiral, reversing his previous policy, seized the Filipino launches; and when Aguinaldo's representative courteously prayed that an explanation might be given to him, he was virtually requested to leave the flagship.

At this time Aguinaldo's officers were treated, it is alleged, with indifference by Admiral

Dewey, and absolutely refused any appointment with, or recognition by, General Otis.

It would be only fair to the Filipinos and to the American people generally, and indeed to all the civilised nations of the world, for the American government to make known what were its instructions from Washington to these two officers, and whether the intentions were as cruel as the orders proved to be when in operation.

It seems almost incredible that General Otis, though ignorant of the Philippines and their people, declined to be advised by the American and British merchants of long residence in Manila, who thoroughly understood the questions involved by the war, and who could have given him advice of the greatest importance to himself and his government, with regard to the treatment of the Filipinos, and the best means to be employed for bringing about a reconciliation between them and the Americans. Mr. Higgins, to whom I have previously referred, as the manager of the railway in Luzon, has repeatedly told me that he urged General Otis to meet General Aguinaldo, but General Otis declined to do so, or even to consider him a figure upon the stage in Philippine questions. There is perhaps no one in Manila at the present time so able to give information concerning the natives as Mr. Higgins; and had

General Otis consulted him, or men like him, the American commander would have acquired much useful information, with the result that there might have been long since a peaceful termination to these unwarrantable hostilities.

In the London *Globe*, dated August 5th, 1899, the following appeared: —

"It is a well-known fact that the Astor Battery, a volunteer regiment equipped by John Jacob Astor of New York State, declared through their officers that they would refuse to reënlist until General Otis was superseded. Numerous interviews from time-expired volunteers who have arrived at San Francisco, abound with the statements of the blundering despotism and incompetence of General Otis."

Yet the American government, though in possession of facts which would cause the withdrawal of any general in the world so placed, declined from time to time to recall him. It allowed him until very recently to continue to misgovern and to mismanage its affairs in the Philippines to the detriment of American interests and to the disgrace of the American people.

CHAPTER IX

Manila in January, 1899 — Increased Wages — Immigration of Chinese forbidden — American Uniforms — Cafés in Manila — Officer's Opinion of his Men — Dissipation among the Troops — A Transport for the Provinces.

MANILA is built, like all Spanish cities, with plazas, lunetas, recreation grounds, and promenades. In the afternoon the shops are closed, and work being over the people, after their siesta in the early afternoon, commence their amusements.

The old city is enclosed by a wall, in some places forty feet in thickness, and from twenty to twenty-five feet in height, surrounded on the outside by a moat, over which, at the several entrances, there are drawbridges, which can be raised and lowered from the inside. The circumference of this prefecture is about three miles, and is supposed to be the finest specimen now extant of this kind of fortification left from the Middle Ages. Before the war it was thought the city was impregnable; but though millions sterling had been absorbed by the local govern-

ment, little or nothing was spent upon the defences of the city. In almost every case the guns employed in these fortifications were useless and obsolete.

The moat, so long disused and neglected, had become a sanitary trouble to the inhabitants, but the Americans endeavoured to improve its condition by clearing it as far as they were able.

Manila is, in my opinion, one of the most picturesque cities I have seen in the East. It contains some of the handsomest buildings in the world, architecturally considered. Its streets are broad and well made, the shops and cafés, suggesting a European town. The private houses are large and spacious, situated in beautiful avenues, shaded by exquisite palms and other tropical vegetation. The population of the city is some two hundred and fifty thousand, two hundred thousand of whom, it was estimated, were Filipinos, the remainder being Chinese and Europeans.

The Luneta is the fashionable drive for the Manila inhabitants. It faces the bay for a distance of about one mile, and is extremely picturesque. Under the Spanish rule it served as an execution ground and as a pleasure resort. Between certain hours, both under the Spaniards and the Americans, a band played national and other music. Well-built carriages of

Parisian design paraded in close order, suggesting the "Bois" or the "Row." The Filipinos, musicians themselves and devoted to music, came with their wives and children to hear the bands of their American allies, and a more peaceful gathering could hardly be found in any part of the world. They invariably uncovered their heads, in compliment to the American people, when "There'll be a Hot Time in the Old Town To-night" was played, they believing that tune to be the national anthem of America. This no doubt was due to the frequency with which the air was played by the bands.

Unfortunately, during the war scares to which I have referred, the American bands did not perform, and this was considered a sign of great weakness by the Filipinos, and indeed by all the foreigners, including the Spaniards, as there was no excuse or justification for the panics that took place.

Before the arrival of the Americans, Manila was a city where those of moderate income could live luxuriously. They had not been long in possession before living, food, and labour became considerably more expensive. They endeavoured to disuse the Mexican dollar, value fifty cents gold, and to introduce the gold dollar with the consequence that both Chinese and Filipinos, labourers and

servants, became demoralised and indifferent, knowing full well that owing to the numbers of Americans in the city their services were indispensable. Below I mention the difference in prices of labour before and after the American occupation.

	Before	After
Carpenters, per day, .	25 to 30 cents	80 to 90 cents
Mechanics, blacksmiths, etc., ...	50 to 60 "	100 to 130 "
Engineers, railway and otherwise, . . .	70 to 75 "	120 to 140 "
Boiler makers, etc., .	80 to 90 "	120 to 150 "
Servants, per month, .	$7 to $14	$40 to $50
Cooks, ...	$12 to $15	$50 to $60

A fatal mistake made by the Americans was to forbid the immigration of Chinese labourers, forgetting that the Filipinos were utterly unable, from many points of view, to conduct the industrial affairs of the colony. On one occasion, I saw a number of Chinamen shipping for Hong Kong. Before sailing they were compelled to submit themselves to the examination of the American official, who, seated with a table in front of him, carefully examined each Chinaman, roughly handling him, in order to discover some mole, birth-mark, or other discoloration on his face or hands, to be inserted into his passport for future identification. After this, a certificate was given to him, for which a high fee was charged, and

without which the long-suffering John could not return to Manila.

The labour of the Philippines, and most certainly of Manila, is purely Chinese. America must discover, as England has found, that no Eastern colony can succeed without them. Hong Kong and Singapore, the Malay states, etc., have become some of our greatest colonies, mainly on account of Chinese labour. Such is the Malay nature that the natives think work menial or otherwise beneath their consideration and contrary to their principles.

America has no doubt been correct in her home policy, in this respect, because it was for the protection of her own industry and manufacture, and the habits and conditions of her people are altogether different; but in the Philippines such a policy is simply absurd. The Chinese are industrious, quick, willing, and frugal, capable of working whatever the climate may be, and their presence, as England's experience has shown, can make a colony both rich and prosperous. Even Spain, now a nation without ambition, and always indifferent to the progress of her colonies, permitted and encouraged Chinese labour, on account of the generally lazy and indolent Filipino nature.

I have frequently heard prominent Filipinos comment upon these restrictions and also upon

the behaviour of the American volunteers in the streets. They were usually dirty in their appearance, and very badly clothed, though the officers of the commissariat had large numbers of uniforms stored; but with these the soldiers had the greatest difficulty in getting them to part. They were made of khaki, and cost at Hong Kong some four to five dollars (eight shillings to ten shillings) a suit. It was a disgrace that these men should have been left in some cases shoeless and almost ragged.

At this time, the Escolta, the principal street in Manila, contained more cafés than I have seen in any one street in any other city of the world. These cafés or saloons were opened and controlled by American hangers-on, who came to Manila to sell intoxicating liquors to the American soldiers. They were not confined to the Escolta only, but rapidly they were opened in all quarters and parts of the town. It was surprising to see the American soldiers patrolling the streets in an intoxicated condition, managing the traffic, and generally acting as police officials, for which they were utterly incompetent; although in fairness to them it must be remembered that many of them were men of some means, who volunteered to fight their country's battles, whilst others, and I should think the majority of them, were men from the Western states, without character and without principle.

There was no disguise as to their discontent; it was open, and the irritation it caused was vented upon the Filipinos.

Of course in a large army of twenty-five thousand men, all volunteers, gathered from all parts of the American continent, it is but natural there should be men of every class. No country in the world without a standing army could form in a few weeks an army of this magnitude without enlisting a large percentage of desperadoes; but then it is all the more important that the discipline should be strict and effective: this was not so in the case of the volunteers in occupation in Manila. They were permitted to lounge about the cafés, and the streets, in a most disorderly condition. Their officers, in the majority of cases, made no effort to break them in or teach them obedience.

A certain colonel, with whom I was on terms of some intimacy, said to me: "I hope you will not form your opinion of our people by those whom you see representing us here. It is impossible for me to justify their conduct; but you must make some allowance for them as volunteers, and if they make mistakes, it is because in many cases the heads of industrial and other firms who have volunteered, have gone as ordinary soldiers, whilst in some cases clerks in their employ at home have been given commissions as officers, and they

therefore have to be careful in their conduct, well knowing that their future depends upon their doing so."

Many thousands of casks of liquor were imported into Manila for the supply of these cafés. It was generally reported in Manila, at the time, that it was smuggled into the city on the pretence that it was for the consumption of the American soldiers, and sold to the keepers of the American liquor shops at a profit. One thing is certain, that the soldiers were often in a condition which rendered them entirely irresponsible. Aguinaldo has frequently said that the conduct of the American soldiers should be investigated by the American government. It was common street talk, that the American officers stripped buildings of tapestry, oil paintings, and all kinds of valuables.

Parties, each consisting of two American soldiers, were organised for the purposes of calling at private houses to inquire whether people of immoral character were residing there, and if they found the male residents absent, they insisted upon searching the house, and stealing whatever property they could carry comfortably with them. This happened at the house of Mr. Wood, with whom I was staying. I saw these men, and threatened to report them. Complaints from the residents were made daily, and I mention this merely to show that

the soldiers were *not* under the control of their officers.

Whilst the Americans were idling in Manila, certain Filipino forces were attacking Iloilo, which is the capital of another of the Philippine Islands, called Panay; and notwithstanding that the Spaniards called upon the Americans to accept the surrender of the town, the Americans waited until the Filipinos had conquered and captured it, when they sent warships and troops with orders that the Filipinos must withdraw.

On the 3d of January, 1899, American troops were embarked with sealed orders, on a small transport for Iloilo. The Filipinos watched with much interest the condition of the men being shipped — they were intoxicated almost to a man, and while waiting for the tender to take them to the vessel a private used offensive language to his officer in charge, in reply to certain orders he was giving. A quarrel ensued, with the result that he struck the officer, who gave him a thrashing which he richly deserved. The man was not reported, nor was he tried by court martial; the officer and the man went together to the transport, as though there had been no disagreement between them.

The vessel remained with the men on board for nearly seven days, packed so closely that it was a matter for surprise how so many

could be shipped in so small a vessel. In that climate, it was the most deliberate cruelty.

It was not an uncommon sight to see an officer being assisted to his quarters by one or two of the ordinaries in his company, and *vice versa*. Their barracks were so offensive that people avoided passing them as much as possible, fever and sickness of course being common among the men.

While I was in Manila, there were a large number of cases of small-pox which were extremely dangerous, the percentage of deaths being, I understood, appallingly large. Fights in the streets were frequent. Yet the Filipinos were asked and expected to respect the Americans, as the conquerors of Spain and the future lords and masters of themselves.

I have frequently stopped my carriage to watch the soldiers drilled, and I have heard either the corporal or the officer ask, "Are you ready?" "Yes," was the reply from the men, "Then quick march." On one occasion, I heard an officer or a sergeant in command giving directions to his men, and the following conversation took place: —

"Stand at ease — before you dismiss, the orders for the night are: that no man is to leave his quarters, and that every man is to be under arms." At this there was general discontent, and grumbling could be distinctly

heard along the lines, and smothered expressions like: "Oh h——. I'll be d——d if I shall obey those rotten orders. It's all bosh, I'll see you in h—— first." To this the man in charge replied: "All right, boys, don't get angry with me. They are not my orders; they are from headquarters. If I had my way, it would be different."

These are but instances of what continually occurred. I have seen the Filipinos standing amazed, as I was, at the discipline of these soldiers.

On the other hand, the Filipinos were obedient, always executing to the letter the commands of their superior officers, always cleanly and neat in their attire, and temperate in their habits.

The Americans, in January of 1899, were in possession only of Cavite and Manila, the area altogether not exceeding five miles. Immediately opposite to their outposts were stationed the Filipino lines, though outside the limits prescribed by General Otis for them to occupy they were only a few yards away.

CHAPTER X

General Otis publishes a Proclamation — Hostile Intention shown — General Otis blunders — General Aguinaldo publishes Two Proclamations

On January 4th, I was with Admiral Dewey, and he told me that "General Otis had in his possession for a considerable time a proclamation from Washington, which he did not desire to publish at present. I am not, however, of his opinion," he added; "Otis has not been here so long as I, and therefore cannot be expected to understand the Filipinos. He has seen very little of them."

The morning following, General Otis issued the proclamation, no doubt owing to the urgent advice of Admiral Dewey.

The proclamation was as follows: —

"PROCLAMATION

"OFFICE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, MANILA, P. I., January 4, 1899.

"*To the People of the Philippine Islands:*

"Instructions of his Excellency, the President of the United States, relative to the administra-

tion of affairs in the Philippine Islands, have been transmitted to me by direction of the Honourable, the Secretary of War, under date of December, 1898. They direct me to publish and proclaim, in the most public manner to the inhabitants of these islands, that in the war against Spain the United States forces came here to destroy the power of that nation, and to give the blessings of peace and individual freedom to the Philippine people, that we are here as friends of the Filipinos, to protect them in their homes, their employments, their individual and religious liberty; that all persons, who either by active aid or honest endeavour coöperate with the government of the United States to give effect to these beneficent purposes, will receive the reward of its support and protection.

"The President of the United States has assumed that the municipal laws of the country, in respect to private rights, and property, and the repression of crime, are to be considered as continuing in force, in so far as they may be applicable to a free people, and should be administered by the ordinary tribunals of justice, presided over by representatives of the people and those in thorough sympathy with them in their desires for good government; that the functions and duties connected with civil and municipal adminis-

tration are to be performed by such officers as wish to accept the assistance of the United States, chosen, in so far as it may be practicable, from the inhabitants of the islands; and while the management of public property and revenue, and the use of all public means of transportation, are to be conducted under the military authorities until such authorities can be replaced by civil administration, all private property, whether of individuals or corporations, must be respected and protected. If private property be taken for military uses, it shall be paid for at a fair valuation in cash, as is practicable at the time; receipts, therefore, will be given, to be taken up and liquidated as soon as cash becomes available. The ports of the Philippine Islands shall be open to the commerce of all foreign nations, and goods and merchandise, not prohibited for military reasons by the military authorities, shall be admitted upon payment of such duties and charges as shall be in force at the time of importation.

" The President concludes his instructions in the following language: —

" ' Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the administration to win the confidence, respect and affection of the Philippines, by insuring to them, in every possible way, the full measure of individual rights and liberty,

which is the heritage of a free people; and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of beneficent assimilation, which will substitute the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfilment of this high mission, while upholding the temporary administration of affairs for the greatest good of the governed, there will be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles, to the bestowal of the blessings of good and staple government upon the people of the Philippine Islands.'

"From the tenor and substance of the above instructions of the President, I am fully of the opinion that it is the intention of the United States government, while directing affairs generally, to appoint the representative men, now forming the controlling element of the Filipinos, to civil positions of trust and responsibility, and it will be my aim to appoint thereto such Filipinos as may be acceptable to the supreme authorities at Washington.

"It is also my belief that it is the intention of the United States government to draw from the Filipino people so much of the military force of the islands as possible and consistent with a free and well-constituted government of the country, and it is my desire to inaugurate a policy of that character; I am also convinced

that it is the intention of the United States government to seek the establishment of a most liberal government for the islands, in which the people themselves shall have as full a representation as the maintenance of order and law will permit, and which shall be susceptible of development on lines of increased representation and the bestowal of increased powers into a government as free and independent as is enjoyed by the most favoured provinces of the world.

"It will be my most constant endeavour to coöperate with the Filipino people seeking the good of the country, and I invite their full confidence and aid.

"E. S. Otis,

"*Major General of the United States Volunteers,*
"*Military Governor.*"

This proclamation at last opened Aguinaldo's eyes, and clearly showed to him and his people that they had been the victims of American duplicity; that the independence for which they had fought so bravely and so long was farther from them now than at any time under the rule of their Spanish oppressors. They saw that the American government meant to conquer and to subjugate them; that the proclamation of General Merritt was but a

will-o'-the-wisp, calculated to trick them into a peaceful alliance so that they might the more easily be disbanded and subdued. In this proclamation by Otis it is stated that the United States forces came to the islands in order to destroy the Spanish power, and among other things to grant "individual freedom." It assures the Filipinos that the Americans were in Manila "as friends."

From the circumstances I have mentioned as to the relations of the Americans with the Filipinos, these assurances of friendship are decidedly open to question.

Continuing, the proclamation suggests that the Filipinos *may* take part in the "civil and municipal administration as far as may be practicable." The President, in conclusion, desires to insure in "every way possible the full measure of individual rights and liberty, which is the heritage of a free people; and proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of beneficent assimilation, which will substitute the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In the fulfilment of this high mission . . . there will be sedulously maintained the strong arm of authority to repress disturbance and to overcome all obstacles."

The above words speak for themselves. It is hardly necessary to comment on them. The

Filipinos are referred to as a free people, deserving individual rights. Has the treatment of the Filipinos by the Americans been such as to suggest that they were a free people, and that the United States were "beneficent" protectors of an oppressed race? In the above proclamation, the American teeth are shown, and the lamb becomes the wolf where, "in the fulfilment of this high mission, there will be maintained the strong arm of authority," etc.

Finally, General Otis implies to the Filipinos that they are conquered, and that he is entitled to all the feudal rights over a subdued nation; for the United States government proposes "to draw from the Filipino people so much of the military force of the islands as possible and consistent with a free and well-constituted government of the country," and that they "shall have as full representation as the maintenance of order and law will permit."

In issuing this proclamation General Otis made a terrible blunder. He first received a copy of one from Washington, which he was to issue, and which upon consultation with Admiral Dewey, no doubt, appeared to be most unsuitable, for it was reported to have contained commands to the Filipinos to lay down their arms. Then General Otis is said to have obtained permission from his government at Washington to remodel it, as his discretion might suggest, and

the one quoted was the proclamation issued. Unfortunately he sent the first one received, in his careless indifference, by a British man-of-war, to be delivered to the commander of an American war vessel at Iloilo, and to be published at once.

The Filipinos, being in constant communication with their forces in all the islands, quickly discovered that *two* proclamations, the one different from the other, had been issued.

General Aguinaldo hurriedly consulted with those in his confidence, and issued the following, which was found posted on the walls and public buildings in the city.

"MANIFESTO OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

"*To my Brother Filipinos, and to All the Consuls, and Other Foreigners:*

"The proclamation of General E. S. Otis, of the volunteers of the United States, published yesterday in the papers of Manila, obliges me to circulate the present, so that all may know who read and understand this my most solemn protest against what is contained in General Otis's proclamation. It is my duty, before my conscience, before God, before my political engagements with my beloved country, and in view of my relations, in particular, with

the officials of North America. General Otis calls himself, in the proclamation referred to, Military Governor of the Philippine Islands, and I protest once, and a thousand times, and with all the energy of my soul, against such authority. I solemnly proclaim that I have never had, either in Singapore, or in Hong Kong, or here in the Philippines, any undertaking or agreement, either by word or by writing, to recognise the sovereignty of America, in this my beloved country. On the contrary, I say that I returned to these islands on board an American warship on the 19th of May of last year, with the decided and manifest proposition to carry on the war with the Spaniards, to reconquer our liberty and our independence. I stated this in my official proclamation on the 24th of the said month of May, and it was published in a manifesto to the Filipino people on the 12th of last June, when in my native town of Cavite, I exhibited, for the first time, our holy national banner as a sacred emblem of that supreme aspiration for independence; and, further, this was indorsed by the American General, Señor Merritt, the predecessor of General Otis, in the manifesto which he directed to the Filipino people, days before he intimated to the Spanish General Jaudenes that the town of Manila had capitulated, in which manifesto it was clearly and definitely stated that the sea

and land forces of the United States had come here to give us our liberty, overthrowing the bad government of Spain.

"Finally, to state the case once and for all, nationals and foreigners are witnesses that the land and sea forces, which are here, of the United States, have recognised by their acts the Filipinos as belligerents, as they have publicly saluted the Philippine flag which triumphantly sailed in these seas, before the eyes of all foreign nations represented here by their respective consuls.

"In the proclamation of General Otis, he alludes to instructions written for him by his Excellency, the President of the United States, referring to the administration of affairs in the Philippine Islands. I solemnly protest, in the name of God, the root and foundation of all justice and of all right, and who has given to me the power to direct my dear brothers in the difficult work of our regeneration,—against this intrusion of the government of the United States in the sovereignty of these islands. Equally, I protest, in the name of all the Filipino people, against this intrusion, because when they gave me their vote of confidence, in electing me, though unworthy, as President of the nation, they imposed on me the duty to sustain to the death their liberty and independence. Lastly, I protest against this act, so

little expected, asserting the sovereignty of America in these islands. I protest in the name of all that is passed, of which I have proofs in my possession referring to my relations with the American authorities, which prove in the most unequivocal manner that the United States did not bring me from Hong Kong to make war against the Spaniards to benefit the Americans, but to help us to gain our liberty and independence, for the attainment of which object the American authorities promised me verbally their decided and efficacious coöperation; and so you must understand, my dear brothers, that, united by bonds which it will be impossible to break, such is the idea of liberty and our absolute independence, which have been our noble aspirations, all must work together to arrive at this happy end, with the force that gives conviction, already so generally felt among all the people, never to turn back in the road of glory on which we have already so far advanced.

"EMILIO AGUINALDO."

MOLOLOS, January 5, 1899.

Have the officials of the American government representing the people of America read this proclamation, and if they have, have they published it to their people, whose honour is at stake in this great question?

Have they inquired into the truth of Aguinaldo's statement in that proclamation that "I returned . . . . to reconquer our liberty and independence . . . . I have proofs in my possession, in referring to my relations with the American authorities which prove in the most unequivocal manner, that the United States did *not* bring me from Hong Kong to make war to benefit the Americans, but to help us to gain our liberty and independence, for the attainment of which object the American authorities promised me verbally their decided and efficacious coöperation"?

On the same day General Aguinaldo published a further proclamation, which is as follows: —

"PROCLAMATION OF GENERAL AGUINALDO TO THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

"The government of the Philippines has come to the conclusion that its duty is to explain before all the civilised powers the facts bearing on the rupture of amicable relations between the Filipinos and the army of the United States of America in these islands, in order that the foreign nations may be convinced that, for my part, I have done everything possible to avoid a rupture, even to the extent of sacrificing uselessly many clear rights. After

the naval battle of the 1st of May, between the Spanish and American squadrons, the commander of the American squadron agreed to my return from Hong Kong to this, my beloved country, and he distributed among the Filipinos a number of rifles taken in the arsenal at Cavite, undoubtedly with the intention that they should be used to support the revolution which was there, to a certain extent, subdued by the agreement of Biacnabato, in order to get the half of the Filipinos on the American side. The Filipinos, on account of the outbreak of war between the United States and Spain, had their eyes open to the necessity of making a fight for their liberty, and they felt sure that the Spanish nation was incapable and unfit to assist the Filipinos on the road to prosperity and progress. Therefore the people greeted my arrival with rejoicings, and I had the honour of being received with acclamation as chief, on account of the service which I had rendered in the former revolution. Thereupon all the Filipinos, without distinction of class or creed, took up arms, and every province set to work to defeat and expel from its midst the Spanish forces located there. This is the explanation of how, in so remarkably short a space of time, my government has acquired domination over the whole of Luzon, the whole of Bisayas, and a part of Mindanao. If the North Americans

have taken no part whatever in these military operations, which have cost no small amount of blood and money, my government does not fail to recognise that the destruction of the Spanish squadron and the handing over of rifles from the arsenal to my people were influential, to some extent, in the success of our arms. I was, moreover, convinced that the American forces must sympathise with the revolution, which they had assisted to foment, and which saved them much bloodshed and hard work, and, above all, I had absolute confidence in the history and traditions of a nation which struggled for independence and for the abolition of slavery; yea, held itself up as the champion and liberator of oppressed peoples under the safeguard of the good faith of a free republic.

"The Americans, seeing the friendly disposition of the Filipino people, disembarked their troops in the village of Parañaque, and took up positions in the whole line occupied by my forces right up to Maytubig, taking possession by their cleverness, not unaccompanied by force, of a large quantity of trenches constructed by my people. Ultimately, the garrison of Manila capitulated, having been compelled to surrender at the first attack. In this I took a very active part, although I was not notified. My forces from the port of Cavite were extended all round the suburbs of

Malate, Ermita, Sampaloc, and Tondo. In spite of all these services, although the Spaniards would not have surrendered if my forces had not closed every road of retreat into the interior, the American generals not merely left me out entirely in the terms of capitulation, but even asked me to withdraw my forces from Cavite and the suburbs of Manila. I have laid before the American generals the injustice which has been done to me, and I have begged them in the most friendly terms to recognise in a satisfactory manner my coöperation, but they have refused anything of the sort. Nevertheless, desirous always of demonstrating my friendship and good sentiments toward those who call themselves liberators of my people, I made my troops evacuate the port of Cavite and the suburbs of Ermita, Malate, Sampaloc, and Tondo, only keeping a portion of the suburb of Paco. In spite of the concessions, before many days passed, Admiral Dewey, with absolutely no cause, seized our launches, which had been flying freely about Manila Bay, hitherto with his express consent.

"About the same time, I received a letter from General Otis, commander in chief of the American army of occupation, demanding that I should withdraw my forces beyond a line marked on a plan, which he also sent me, within which line were included the village of

Pandacan and the hamlet of Singalong, which never came within the heading 'Manila and suburbs.' In view of this inexplicable attitude of both American chiefs, I called my generals together in consultation, and at the same time I held a 'privy council' (consejo de gobierno), and in accordance with the opinions of both bodies I named commissioners to put themselves in communication with the American authorities. Admiral Dewey received my commissioner very cavalierly and with most aggressive language, and never gave him a chance to reply. Yet I complied with the request of General Otis, withdrawing my troops to the line desired, with the object of avoiding contact with their troops, — a cause of much dissatisfaction to our people, — but we hoped that *the Paris conference would soon end*, and that my people would obtain the complete independence promised by the United States.

"Consul General Pratt, in Singapore, said we should have a formal guarantee of the friendship proclaimed in manifestos and speeches by the American generals who have come here. But it was not so. These generals took all my concessions in the cause of peace and friendship as indications of weakness. So, their ambition increasing, they sent forces to Iloilo, on the 26th of December last, with the object of taking possession in the guise of con-

querors of the islands occupied by my government.

"Such a proceeding, so far removed from the principles of good conduct and from the practice observed by civilised nations, gives me the right to act quite independently of such considerations. However, for the sake of acting with propriety up to the end, I sent to General Otis commissioners, with instructions to beg him to desist from his rash undertaking; but these overtures were entirely unnoticed.

"My government cannot remain indifferent in view of a violent and aggressive usurpation of a portion of our territory by a people which calls itself defender of oppressed nations. So my government is prepared to commence hostilities if the American forces attempt to carry out by force the occupation of the Bisayas. I proclaim these facts before the whole world, in order that the universal conscience may point out inflexibly who are the real oppressors of nations and the executioners of humanity. On their heads be all the blood that will be spilt!

"EMILIO AGUINALDO.

"MOLOLOS, January 5, 1899."

Reference is made in this proclamation to certain promises made by Consul General

Pratt. He assured me that in regard to the matter he only acted upon instructions, as I have stated, and the matter therefore, in justice to him, calls for careful investigation by the American people.

"These generals took all my concessions in the cause of peace and friendship as indications of weakness."

Can this arraignment be answered? Can this conduct on the part of America be justified?

The Filipinos are said to be barbarians, incapable of self-government, because it is alleged they are unacquainted with the conventionalities of civilisation. But this is utterly untrue. The Filipinos can govern, and govern well, the people of their islands. Those at the head of their present republic are men of culture, of taste, and of education. A stranger planted on the moors of Yorkshire, and coming into contact with the yokels of that county, might say that England was unfit for self-government, but ministers of state do not belong to these classes in England, nor in the Philippines, nor in any other country in the world.

For several months the Filipinos had charge of the internal government of the islands; and they were admirably governed. They controlled the postal and telegraphic arrangements for the interior, and all foreigners know how perfect that service was.

These proclamations of Aguinaldo are remarkable in their sentiments and sincerity, and read beside the proclamations of General Otis make the generosity of the nation protecting the "oppressed" pale before the magnanimity of the Filipinos. They point to a blot so black upon the history of the war that the American people, not the government, will have difficulty in preventing it from obliterating its glory and its cause!

Can it be said that these two proclamations contain the hysterical sentiments of a frenzied and barbaric people? The American nation will admit, when the true facts are made known to them, that great injustice has been done to General Aguinaldo, the President of the Filipinos, who in his proclamation calls upon his creator to witness that he has done all in his power to avoid bloodshed. "I have," he says, "laid before the American generals the injustice that has been done me." Have those generals reported those injustices to the American government? If they have not, why not? and if they have, has the government made any atonement for the wrongs it has done toward an innocent and confiding people? From my personal knowledge, I know that the United States, through its representative, General Otis, declined to recognise the Filipinos as a race of men, and refused to listen to their prayers for mercy and for justice.

General Aguinaldo, like a man, proclaims not only to the Americans, but to all the representatives of the world, that he had been promised the independence of his people in consideration of his assisting America to destroy Spain's forces in the Philippines. He calls upon the consuls of all nations to witness that whatever blood may be shed, the responsibility for it rests upon the shoulders of the American representatives. If the statements contained in the proclamation of Aguinaldo were untrue, why did Otis not deny them in a subsequent proclamation, not only to the Filipino people but to the representatives of the civilised nations of the world?

CHAPTER XI

Anxious Time in Manila — Another Proclamation — Exodus of Natives — Rumoured Massacre of Americans — Within the "Rebel" Lines — The British Flag a Passport — "Rebel" Launches — Drill of "Rebel" Soldiers — Otis declines to assist British Merchants — The Forces at Cavite — Another Scare — A Filipino child shot dead

AFTER the issue of these proclamations, the city was in a very disturbed condition, and great anxiety prevailed. The last proclamation was considered as a declaration of war by the Filipinos, against the Americans. It was estimated that there were about two hundred thousand "rebels" in the city employed as servants to the Americans and Europeans, and in other positions. These serving people were armed with bolos and guns, and were prepared to rise upon a given signal from Aguinaldo. Around the city, it was stated, there were thirty thousand armed troops, in addition to the two hundred thousand men in the city.

That a scheme for a rising had been organised was true, as I afterward heard at Mololos.

An attack, it was alleged, had been planned upon Manila for the 15th of January, when at a certain hour the two hundred thousand rebels in the city were to rise, cut off the electric light, and massacre the Americans, whilst the troops outside the city were to attack at all points. The English and other foreign inhabitants were to hang at their gates their national flag, and their houses were to be left untouched by the Filipinos. The native women were ordered by Aguinaldo to leave Manila, and in the event of their not doing so, the risk and responsibility were to be their own.

Carts, trucks, and other vehicles were passing in a continuous train, through the streets, all day long, conveying Filipino women with their children and their household effects to the railway station, en route for the interior. Mr. Higgins told me he was obliged to run special trains almost hourly, in order to cope with the increased passenger traffic. It was calculated that five thousand Filipinos left Manila by train and by road in twenty-four hours. This exodus from the city continued for many days.

Having my wife with me in Manila, I was naturally anxious to ascertain the real dangers to which she was likely to be subjected. I therefore asked my friend, Mr. Higgins, to arrange for me an interview with General Agui-

naldo. This he was good enough to do. He and Mr. Wood, my kind host, and I proceeded by an early train to Mololos, distant about thirty-five miles from Manila. Mr. Higgins had provided for my accommodation his private car, which was attached to the end of the train.

After we had left Manila station, we passed almost immediately out of the American lines and entered those of the Filipinos. At Coloogan station, about three miles from Manila, where the train waited, the Filipinos had dug excellent trenches, and had erected guns along the railway track, as I thought, in positions most dangerous to an approaching enemy. This was also the opinion of Captain Montgomery, the commander of H.M.S. *Bonaventure*, who went into the interior of Luzon to Bayambang with us on one occasion.

On our arrival at the station, the Filipino soldiers, armed with Mauser rifles, surrounded our carriage, thinking we were Americans, and when the station master whistled the train's departure, the Filipino officers in charge of the soldiers ordered it "to halt." The situation was sudden and delicate, as the Filipinos were in earnest. They had levelled their guns at our carriage, and Mr. Higgins, ever ready in an emergency, quickly explained that I was English, going to Mololos to visit Aguinaldo. No

further opposition was then offered to the train proceeding.

At Mololos railway station, we were met by Señor Buencamino, one of Aguinaldo's chief officers and advisers. He had very kindly provided caramattas (native carriages) to take us to General Aguinaldo's headquarters, in Mololos town, which is situated about a mile and a half from the station. As we passed the numerous Filipino outposts along the road, we were repeatedly challenged, and but for Señor Buencamino, we should have had much difficulty in reaching Mololos.

Passing through the town, I was surprised to see many stone-built houses, whereas I had expected to see only nipa ones (native houses), as in the interior; but in Mololos there were a great many stone edifices, as in Manila. We arrived at a large building of one story, from which numbers of Filipino soldiers were issuing. I was informed we had reached the headquarters of the Filipinos. This house had been formerly a Spanish monastery. Señor Buencamino preceded us and passed between innumerable sentries and officials, to a short, broad staircase, which led to a long wide corridor, in which were standing groups of Filipino officers, dressed in gorgeous and picturesque uniforms, resembling those of the old French hussars.

It became immediately apparent how inti-

mately associated Mr. Higgins must have been with these gentlemen, for he was received with the utmost cordiality. I was introduced to many of them, and I found several were men who had travelled in Europe and America, and spoke English fluently. They were educated and thoroughly conversant with Western customs and habits. We were quickly ushered into a large room, or hall, which I understood was the "chamber" of the republic. We were not kept waiting long, before we were informed that Señor, the President, would be happy to receive us.

General Aguinaldo greeted us in a large well-furnished room, in which I noticed he had a Maxim gun of the most improved type. He was courtly and dignified in his demeanour, and impressed me most favourably. He is a man of some thirty years of age, with a clean-shaven face.

He told me he was always happy to meet Englishmen, because he had the most implicit confidence in them and their dealings. I told him the reasons of my visit, and he replied most kindly that he hoped there was no immediate cause for alarm, and he did not see any necessity why a lady should leave Manila, at any rate for the present. He hoped to avoid a conflict with the American forces, but their conduct was a continual source of irritation to his soldiers. He

added, that in any event the lives and property of the British and other foreigners should be protected and respected. It might be well to display from the windows of the house the English flag.

Mr. Wood told General Aguinaldo that it was our intention to go to the Lake de Bay during the next few days, and he promised to send a pass through his lines at Santa Ana.

General Aguinaldo impressed me as a man of great reticence and discernment. He talked little, but paid great attention to everything that was said to him. After our interview, we returned to Manila.

The Manila newspapers continued to excite the minds of both the American and Filipino soldiers by their ridiculous and inflammatory inventions.

As time passed, affairs were not improved. Trouble commenced between the merchants and General Otis, who declined to assist them in the continuance of their trade.

To illustrate this, I will mention a case. Messrs. Smith, Bell & Co., one of the most important firms in Manila, had chartered a vessel from Hong Kong to collect a certain cargo from Cebu, an island some distance from Luzon. The Consul General, Mr. Rounseville Wildman, declined to despatch the vessel from Hong Kong. Messrs. Smith, Bell & Co.

then approached General Otis, who refused to assist them. Mr. Wood, a partner in that celebrated house, asked: "Are the Philippine ports to be closed? We are English traders, and have a vessel waiting to take a cargo from an island on which no war has been declared, and you decline to despatch our ship? Am I to cable home to say the Philippine ports are closed to business?"

"You can do as you like," replied General Otis.

It was most unfortunate that the British merchants had lost their consul, Mr. Walker, who, as I stated in a previous chapter, died from the effects of the siege; no other consul had been appointed in his place. The acting Consul, Mr. Ramsden, a pleasant and popular man, had no influence, and was entirely disregarded by the American local government on account of his being a coloured man.

In the "rebel" lines great excitement prevailed. On the receipt of Aguinaldo's pass, we went in Mr. Wood's launch up the Rio Passig to the Lake de Bay. When we arrived at Mandaloyan and Santa Ana, which is a distance of about five miles by the river, and about three miles by the road, from Manila, we were challenged by the "rebel" sentries. The display of the British flag was a sufficient pass for our launch.

Santa Ana was at that time the stronghold of the so-called rebels surrounding that part of Manila, and they occupied as barracks the old Spanish houses in the town. There were a few English families still residing there in the midst of the Filipino lines, amongst whom were Mr. and Mrs. Fitten, and Mr. and Mrs. Macleod.

I asked Mr. Fitten, on one occasion, whether his wife was not alarmed at the rumoured reports of war, and he replied, "Oh, no, the Filipino general in command of the forces in Santa Ana assures us we shall be safer here than in Manila."

Arriving at Pambeck, a native nipa village, we met two large launches, with three or four hundred "rebel" troops on board. At first they looked fiercely at our launch, and covered us with their guns; but directly they saw the flag we carried, they cheered enthusiastically. These men were coming from the lake region, to take up their positions, and to be in readiness for trouble in Santa Ana. Launches carrying native troops were continuously passing us during the day. Later, on our return, we found the troops we had passed were being drilled within fifty yards of the American lines. The contrast was amazing, — the little Filipino in his clean white uniform, obedient and silent to his superior officer, with banners flying, and bands playing the most charming marches, and

on the other hand, the Americans in their dirty and ragged brown khaki uniforms, shouting to each other, and using profane language fluently.

I went also to Cavite and passed the "rebel" sentries, and entered the insurgent quarters of the town. Here, too, the American and Filipino sentinels were only a few yards apart.

I was much struck with the attitude taken by the Filipinos. They were, no doubt, preparing for war, and many were sharpening their bolos (native knives) and cleaning their guns. I asked one if I could purchase a bolo, and the Filipino replied: "I fear we shall need them all. The Americans are forcing us to war, which we have endeavoured to avoid. We have done them no harm, and in return for our good services they desire to kill us." I asked him whether he thought war certain, and he replied, "I hope not; but whatever consequences there may be, our General Aguinaldo has called upon us to be prepared, and perhaps in a week we may be dead."

The forces at Cavite were by no means strong, and the Americans could, I knew, either from the sea or the land, destroy every one of these poor creatures, who had enrolled themselves unselfishly under the banner of independence.

The most serious "scare," perhaps, that occurred in Manila at any time before February 4, 1899, was the one in the afternoon of the

11th of January, which was attended, it was reported, with the loss of two lives. A soldier on guard in the Escolta, having nothing better to do, shot at a dog in the street three times with his revolver, without effect, and another soldier, who was not far distant, drew his revolver and emptied its chambers at the dog. The noise of the shots being heard, a report was communicated, almost instantly, to every American in the town, that the insurgents had attacked them at last. The panic was terrible: the shops were shut and barricaded; people were rushing trembling with fear from place to place, imploring protection; women and children stood screaming in the streets with fear. The American soldiers were also stricken with the same panic. The news was communicated immediately to headquarters, where plans were quickly conceived, and from whence intelligent orders were issued; the regiments were called from their quarters, the streets were barricaded, the bridges were armed with men, the traffic was stopped, and inquiries were made. The quickness with which the position was controlled did credit to those responsible for the conception and promulgation of the orders. At the same time the rumours of the unknown danger so excited the American sentries, that a Filipino riding past a sentry, on being challenged and unable to control his horse, was shot dead.

Another case — one of the most brutal of all American atrocities in the Philippines, and one which filled the Filipinos with just indignation and horror — was where a Filipino child, playing outside a Chinaman's store, took an egg, laughingly, from his stall, without any intention of stealing it, and was shot by an American soldier. Old John Chinaman is most devoted to children. He was literally amazed that men, reported to be civilised, could hurt, much less kill, anything unable to offer apology or explanation for an offence which in no sense and by no law warranted a criminal's death.

CHAPTER XII

Conversation with Aguinaldo and Buencamino — Invitation by the Merchants to act as Intermediary between Otis and Aguinaldo — Rising reported Imminent — Conversation with Dewey — American Views of Situation — A Visit to Corregidor — Description of American Hospital

I saw General Aguinaldo many times, and on one occasion I took my wife to see him. Among the periodicals which we had to amuse us in the train, on our way to Mololos, was the Christmas number of an American weekly comic journal, in which President McKinley was portrayed, offering to the Senate as his Christmas gift a large white elephant, which represented the Philippine Islands. This we gave to General Aguinaldo, who recognised the satire of the caricature immediately, and enjoyed the comedy suggested. He asked us to allow him to keep it.

At another of my interviews, he asked me, on hearing that I was an English barrister, to prepare for him a code of mining laws, remarking, "I have confidence in the English law, because I know it is humane and just."

On one occasion, Señor Buencamino said that the question of telegraphing for assistance to Mr. Chamberlain had been discussed, and that the Filipinos would lay down their arms if England would take over the islands. I replied that in the present circumstances, there would be great opposition to such a policy. But said Buencamino, "practically, the whole trade of the Philippines is British; will she not protect her merchants and her trade?"

I told him that as she was not doing so in China, and I failed to see what inducement she would have for doing so in the Philippines.

On the 12th of January, my host, Mr. Wood, having regard to the serious condition of affairs in Manila, the possible loss of life and property in the event of a rupture between the two opposing forces, as well as the temporary destruction of British trade in the Philippines, invited me to act as intermediary on behalf of the merchants in Manila, and to bring about, if possible, a reconciliation between the Americans and the Filipinos. Mr. Higgins joined Mr. Wood in the request, informing me that he represented nearly one million eight hundred thousand pounds invested interest in his line, and that a war would mean for a certainty a partial destruction of his properties, and the total loss of pecuniary returns.

They both urged upon me the importance

of the mission which I, having neither trade nor business in the Philippine Islands, and being unconnected with either side, might possibly bring to a successful issue.

I, of course, consented to act for them in the manner suggested, provided I received a written request signed by the whole body of the representatives of invested British capital in the Philippines, which amounted to some eight millions sterling.

On the 14th of January, the rumours in Manila were most alarming. Mr. Fitten told me he thought a rising probable, because the night previously the "insurgents" within whose lines he was living were singing rebel songs.

This sort of information, confirmed by the newspapers, was the cause of many of the panics in Manila, whereas, in fact, Aguinaldo had no intention of attacking the city. I saw a letter from him to Mr. Higgins, in which he stated he had heard the rumour of his proposed attack on Manila. He was not at a loss to understand the object of these wicked inventions; but he desired Mr. Higgins to acquaint his friends that before he commenced hostilities, or declared war against the Americans, he would duly notify the consuls, representing the foreign powers and the American military general, and he also made a similar promise to me on a subsequent occasion.

In one of my several interviews with Admiral Dewey, he said "he had received representatives from Aguinaldo who told him they could take possession of Manila when they chose," and he replied, "very well, and suppose you do: I should blow you and Manila clean off the earth; but," he added, "whenever I speak harshly and threaten them, their little commander Aguinaldo always sends me some trifling souvenir of my hard words. After the last occasion, he sent me a walking-stick. I always feel very sorry for the little chap."

Dewey undoubtedly appeared opposed to the annexation of the Philippines. I am afraid that sufficient consideration was not paid by the American government to his views. Admiral Dewey is not a man likely to arrive at conclusions without the most ample justification. If he formed an opinion, it may be rightly supposed he had weighty reasons for supporting it. On one occasion he told me he feared to return to America, on account of the probability of his being fêted and lionised by the American nation. No man in the United States deserves to be honoured and admired more than this brave and thoughtful commander, who, as I have stated before, could alone have prevented the bungle caused by having "too many cooks to make the Filipino broth."

There was hardly an officer in the American

army or navy, in the Philippines who in discussing the future policy in the islands did not end in saying: "We know we have got into a dreadful mess, but how are we to get out of it? We don't want the archipelago. We have no trade here, and England has about three times the trade of any other nationality in the Philippines. Why don't she take them off our hands? What can we do now? Leave them? Give them back to the Spaniards, or pack up and go away without saying anything to anybody? Germany then would step in as we step out. She has been waiting for it."

At Corregidor, an island some thirty miles from Manila, commanding the entrance to the bay, I saw the American hospital for convalescent soldiers, under the very able command of Major Owen, who kindly showed me results of his good work. He had done wonders in the camp, his sanitary arrangements were perfect, he had two hundred and fifty convalescents in the establishment which he had built for them. He told me he had not received sufficient pecuniary support from Manila, but he had managed to get along without it. He had provided the men with tables, which he had made from packing cases; they were having dinner, of very excellent food. I should say that all the American soldiers received the

best possible food, — and later, when the Filipino-American war commenced, I remember hearing the following remark made by one American soldier to another, about the supplies to one of their regiments "at the front": "Why, you won't believe it, but the boys at the front had nothing to eat but tinned things for the whole of twenty-four hours, and they did not complain."

The American hospital at Corregidor is attached to the ground by steel ropes to prevent it being carried away by the typhoons, so frequent in certain months in the Philippines.

In the small native village on the island, I noticed the Filipinos were very friendly with the Americans, and seemed quite satisfied with the American occupation of that place — of course the number of the inhabitants was very small and entirely without arms.

During this time, I was a frequent visitor to General Aguinaldo, at Mololos. He was quite willing, and indeed most anxious, that the misunderstanding between himself and the Americans should be amicably arranged. He did not, in any sense, desire the withdrawal of the American troops. He wished them to remain to protect the natives from foreign powers, while at the same time he insisted on Filipino independence. He would have gladly accepted a government on the following terms: —

(1) The Americans to remain in islands, and to have possession and control of the ports, through which all exports and imports from, and to the interior should pass.

(2) The Americans to collect all the duties at the said ports.

(3) The duties, when collected, to be divided into three parts. (*a*) One-third to be appropriated for the repayment of the twenty million dollars paid, or agreed to be paid, to Spain. (*b*) One-third to be retained by the Americans, for the maintenance of their fleet and army in the Philippines. (*c*) And one-third to be paid to the Filipino republic for the maintenance of its government.

(4) That the Filipinos should form their government, which should legislate for the Philippine Islands, subject to the superintending advice of an American official, to be appointed by the American government, and whose advice should be final.

Under an agreement of this sort, the American government would have been in practical possession of the Philippine Islands, really legislating and controlling the native government through its adviser.

Great Britain has found this form of local government work exceedingly well in the Malay states, where it gives great satisfaction to the native inhabitants.

It also satisfies the wounded dignity of the higher native officials, who have not, as the Chinese would say, "lost face" because they are members of their own government.

In consequence of the position taken up by one of the bank managers in Manila, I felt I could not act officially for the merchants in the matter of mediation. This gentleman stated he preferred the Americans to the Filipinos, from a business point of view. In the event of American annexation, he expected capital would be literally poured into Manila for investment in the islands, and he therefore declined either, to sign a request to me for arbitration, or in any way to support a settlement of the questions in dispute between the American government and the Filipinos.

Though I was frequently urged by the merchants to mediate without the coöperation of this particular bank manager, I decided not to do so unless there was complete unanimity among them, and I therefore refused to take any further steps as an authorized intermediator between the opposing parties.

CHAPTER XIII

Caloogan on the 22nd of January, 1899 — Presidential Election — Two American Deserters in Filipino Army — Archbishop P. Nozaleda — A Native Luncheon Party in the Interior

THE 22nd of January was a great day, both at Caloogan and at Mololos, and, indeed, in all the towns in the Filipino republic. It was the day of the presidential election. Thousands of Filipino soldiers were travelling from all points on the railway line to vote at Mololos. I was at Caloogan, and I was greatly surprised to see in the Filipino lines two American soldiers wearing the Filipino uniform. It appeared they had deserted from the American ranks and had joined Aguinaldo's army.

This I did not believe. I surmised that they were American spies. If this was so, they must have been plucky to have placed themselves in so perilous a situation. As the trains passed us packed with soldiers, the men cheered with great enthusiasm.

It is needless to say that Aguinaldo was elected President of the Filipino republic, and

there was great rejoicing among the Filipinos throughout the length and breadth of the Philippines. The native priests caused special masses to be said for General Aguinaldo and the cause of independence. I should state that the Filipinos are for the most part devout Roman Catholics. General Aguinaldo sent to the merchants and residents in Manila a circular, informing them of the fact of his appointment.

I frequently saw the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, the Most Rev. Señor Nozaleda, who was always most courteous. He was ever curious to hear what Aguinaldo had said to me. He referred to Aguinaldo as "that rascal" on all occasions. This was to be expected, as the Archbishop had been under the Spanish rule, and, consequently, an actor in the oppression of the Filipinos. To him had been attributed the execution of Dr. Rizal, on the Luneta, on the 30th of December, 1896, after that patriot had suffered years of persecution and injustice.

On one occasion, I went into the interior to a luncheon party given by General Buencamino at his house. Mr. and Mrs. H——, Mr. W——, Mrs. A——, my wife, and myself were invited. I will describe the luncheon briefly, so that my readers may judge the native in his home, and consider whether the Filipinos are the barbarians they have been reported to

be. At this luncheon General Aguinaldo was expected to be present.

We arrived at S—— at about twelve o'clock, noon, where, at the station, we found General Buencamino and a number of his officers awaiting our arrival. He had provided carriages, as in London, Paris, or New York. His house was about a mile from the railway station, and overlooked the river Rio Grande. The dwelling was enclosed in a tropical compound, prettily laid out with bright flowers and palms. It was partly built of stone and partly of wood, and consisted of one story. From an architect's point of view it was beautiful. The rooms were unusually large and extremely lofty. General Buencamino informed me this house had been in his family one hundred and fifty years.

On our approach, a band (composed of Filipino musicians, playing on harps, violins, mandolins, guitars, and other stringed instruments) commenced a melody of welcome. This band played some charming native tunes most delightfully. The natives are as musical as the Italians, and sing almost as sweetly, though their voices are not trained, and, therefore, not so effective. Their music is not confined to native or Spanish. We were much surprised to hear the first movement of Beethoven's "Moonlight" sonata.

On entering the house, we were met by the daughters of our host, who received us with genuine warmth. There was a large party of Filipino officers and native ladies, all dressed in the picturesque and becoming costume of their country. Señor Buencamino said to my wife: "General Aguinaldo desired me to express to you his deep regret that business of an urgent nature prevented his attendance to-day, but that he hopes to have the honour of entertaining you shortly at Mololos, when he will be host, instead of guest."

The dinner service was made of pure silver, and General Buencamino apologised for not having had his more valuable service. "I have," he said, "had to bury my plate already three times from the Spaniards, and this service has only recently been unearthed for your benefit. The other is underground near the river, and this will soon join it in case of sudden emergencies." The wines, champagne, sherry, claret, port, etc., were provided with ice, which we had been unable to obtain in Manila, except through the kindness of Admiral Dewey, who frequently supplied us with it.

Toward the end of luncheon, the band struck up the national anthem of the Filipino people, and afterward played the "Aguinaldo March," the composer, a handsome Filipino, conducting.

The conversation at the table was brilliant; there were no events in history with which these people were not acquainted. They spoke English, French, German, and Spanish.

In my conversation with an important official in Aguinaldo's government, he told me that he had been compelled to imprison two Americans, one of whom had been travelling under English papers, which, on examination, were proved to be forged, whilst the other pretended he was an English prospector. In his bag, however, were found maps and plans of Mololos and other Filipino strongholds; yet these persons were only being detained. I asked whether they were to be shot, and he replied: "No; we do not wish to kill or cause unnecessary bloodshed, though the Americans are trying to force us to war. Last night I had reported to me that a Filipino woman was shot in the streets of Manila for seeking medicine for her sick child. This I knew was true, but the American who shot the woman stated his gun was fired accidentally. Can such things," continued this official, "be tolerated by a just and peaceful people? We have no confidence in the Americans now. Are you surprised? If they take these islands, they shall have them without the people. There is not one Filipino in all our many islands, who is not ready to lay down his life for the inde-

pendence of the republic, and this sentiment extends also to our women and children." He told me further that they had forty-two Maxim guns which they knew how to handle.

Speaking to one of the aides-de-camp of Aguinaldo, he said something almost similar. "We have been led by America and her representatives to believe that we should have our freedom. If America has changed her mind or her policy, and desires to seize our country, well, she can have it; but not till she has killed every man of our people — we love life, but without freedom we prefer death. The Americans call us niggers, because our skins are browned; but," he added sneeringly, "if we niggers desired to take Manila, all that would be necessary would be to roll into the city sufficient whiskey, wait until the soldiers consumed it, — which would not take them long, — and then enter the city."

When lunch, coffee, and cigars were finished, we went into the ballroom to dance. This was a large room with a polished floor, and would have done credit to any public ballroom in London.

CHAPTER XIV

Mololos, February 4th, 1899 — Outbreak of Filipino–American War — Panic at the Circus — Behaviour of Volunteers — A Trying Night — Filipino Lines shelled by American Warships — Fires in and around the City — Paco Church destroyed — Remarkable Graves and Customs

On the morning of the 4th of February, I went to Mololos with Mr. —— and Mr. ——. General Buencamino met us as usual at the station, and accompanied us to the palace in the afternoon, where we were immediately received by General Aguinaldo, with whom we remained some hours.

He had a cabinet and a council meeting with his generals. He told me he had considered the suggested form of independence, before referred to, and that he and his colleagues were satisfied with it.

We returned from Mololos at 6 o'clock P.M.; we left there all Aguinaldo's principal generals and official supporters. This I can state absolutely, because most of them we saw shortly before our return.

GRAVES IN PACO CHURCH.

At this time a circus, "Warren's Combined Shows," was performing at Manila, close under the Filipino lines.

On this particular evening, our host had two boxes for the entertainment, and had invited a number of people to dinner and to go with us afterward to the circus. At 8.45 P.M. our party, consisting of Mr. and Mrs. Higgins, Mr. and Mrs. Todd, Mr. Morris, Mr. Wood, my wife and myself, drove some two and a half miles to the circus.

We heard that the Americans had been under arms during the afternoon, and were so still. This we could not understand, as we knew the Filipinos contemplated no action, and therefore we concluded the report was without foundation.

The performance took place in a large tent, capable of accommodating about eight hundred or a thousand people. The boxes were placed immediately adjoining the arena.

When we arrived at 9.10, every seat in the place was filled. The cheaper seats, which were built in tiers almost to the roof, were occupied principally by American soldiers, of whom there must have been some six or seven hundred. The performance was an exceedingly good one; but it was interrupted at 9.30 by the abrupt entrance of an American soldier, who, placing his two hands to his mouth in trumpet form,

shouted the words, "Prepare, the rebels are upon us," and immediately afterwards disappeared.

Thereupon a terrible scene of panic ensued. The American soldiers rushed to the door in the wildest excitement, trampling under or throwing aside women and children. Everybody was in the greatest state of consternation and fear. All the boxes contained ladies; we called to them to remain seated and to await the departure of the soldiers, who apparently considered their own safety of first importance. Mr. George Warren, the manager, with admirable courage, hurried forward and announced to the audience "A false alarm," at which those remaining gained courage. In a few minutes nearly the whole audience had left the entertainment. The performance was, however, continued, and gradually I noticed a few of the panic-stricken soldiers return again, and take up their positions by the door. In reflecting on the conduct of these men, I fail to find in it any justification. They were, it is true, armed with revolvers only, and were without their guns, and may have feared being caught and massacred in an enclosed space; but even so, they were men, and it was their place to have lessened and quieted the panic rather than have caused it.

Mr. Wood left the circus to inquire as to the real events, and to see whether our carriages

were still waiting. He returned quickly and informed us that one of our carriages had been taken by the soldiers.

We remained watching the performance for some twenty minutes longer, when it became apparent that some serious action had been taken. Volley after volley was being fired, and the bullets whistled past us through the tent with unpleasant distinctness.

At the entrance we found the utmost commotion. People were rushing wildly to and fro, unconscious of what they did or where they went. Soldiers were ordering the natives to their homes, and were shooting those who refused to obey. The night became as light as day, — illumined by burning houses. The noise of guns was deafening, and bullets were simply raining around us.

The terror of the situation was relieved by the heroism of the ladies with us, and particularly in the case of Mrs. Higgins. I have already stated that Mr. and Mrs. Higgins lived outside the American and inside the Filipino lines. We had not only the horrors of the engagement now being fiercely carried on within a few yards of us, but we expected the Filipino population would rise and massacre without mercy the Americans in the city. Mr. Wood suggested to Mrs. Higgins the hopelessness of trying to reach her house, and there-

fore invited her to his which faced the sea, where, if necessary, she could escape in one of his steam launches anchored in the bay. Mrs. Higgins, calm, and without fear, said: "Do you think, Mr. Wood, that either my husband or myself would consider our own safety when our two children are left at Caloogan? I thank you, but whatever the dangers or the risks may be, we must and we shall reach our home to-night." This they did on a trolley, worked by Mr. Higgins on the railway track.

After Mr. and Mrs. Higgins drove away, we hurried from this dreadful scene of the dying and the dead, and got into our two remaining carriages. They had to be driven at a walking pace, because the American soldiers along the road were lying in ditches with their guns resting upon the banks, ready to fire at sight, and each group of soldiers called upon us to halt as we travelled along, with the crack of rifles in our ears all around us. In parts of the city through which we were obliged to pass, I noticed many of the American soldiers were calm and collected, notwithstanding their compulsory inactivity in most trying circumstances; and after we had answered their challenges, they said, in several cases, that they were glad the trouble had begun.

The heavy firing continued until about 2 o'clock A.M., when the Americans determined

BONES EXHUMED FROM GRAVES FOR NON-PAYMENT OF RENT.

to await daylight and not waste further ammunition.

As will be seen from the map, Manila forms a half circle around the limits of which the rebel lines had been permitted by the Americans to camp. When the first shot had been fired by the Americans as I shall subsequently show, the attack of the Filipinos became general from every point or zone in the semicircle.

In the days of the Filipino-Spanish wars, the fighting always took place at night. When the day broke, the firing in nearly all cases ceased, and both sides retired.

The Filipinos were no doubt much surprised, therefore, to find the Americans waiting for the day. At 4 o'clock A.M., the United States cruiser, *Charleston*, commenced shelling the rebel lines beyond the fort of San Antonio, and thus prevented them from forcing an entrance into that end of Manila. Mr. Wood's house, at which we were staying in the city, was situated next to the Manila Club, which has a high watch-tower, with a flat roof. On this roof we all assembled, and could plainly see the fighting around us. Simultaneously with the shelling by the United States warships, the American forces charged and harried the unprepared Filipinos, pressing them back by fearful onslaughts from their positions.

There was now no longer any question as to the courage of the American soldiers. Whatever their failings had been hitherto, they now exhibited the bravery of their race. Deeds of chivalry and heroism were performed by these volunteer men, undisciplined though they were, which some day will be recorded.

However much I have been compelled to condemn their conduct in times of peace, I must confess gladly and freely that I felt proud that these soldiers, fighting so bravely, were practically our own people.

At one time, I saw as many as seventeen fires, both large and small. But for the shells from the vessels, the Americans would have been sorely pressed and tried; these frightful messengers of destruction wrought the most awful havoc in the Filipino lines. At 7 o'clock A.M., we were compelled to withdraw from the watch-tower, on account of the storm of bullets around us.

At one time the fighting was so close to us that we thought it might be necessary to take to the launches.

By 10 o'clock A.M., Paco and Santa Ana were in the hands of the Americans, who were pressing the Filipinos beyond the water-works at Santolan, some five miles from Manila, fearing lest these might be destroyed and the city be left without water.

The Filipino Martyrs

Paco, a district of Manila, had been burnt, and the church destroyed, though its tower was still standing. On my arrival here, I was told that some sixty Filipinos were in the tower. I stood opposite with some American soldiers and a lady, who had been brought from Santa Ana.

The Filipinos in the tower had control of the road, both to Santa Ana and to Manila; they repeatedly fired at officers who passed up and down the road, but they did not shoot privates. American soldiers, under cover of the wall which surrounded the church, fired into the tower when they thought a head appeared at the iron grating which was in the top part of the structure.

A large gun was brought from Manila for the purpose of shelling this tower and destroying the Filipinos; but during the time I waited, the tower had not been demolished. I inquired of the soldier at my side whether anything could save the Filipinos in the tower, and he replied: "No, I don't think so. You see the boys are out killing now, and they have old scores to pay." "Not," I asked, "if they put out a white flag?" "No," he said, "I think the boys would not let them go." As a matter of fact, the tower was not destroyed, and the Filipinos escaped that night.

Paco church was remarkable for its sort of

pigeon-hole graves at the rear, in which people had been buried, and for which rents were paid to the priests by the relatives or descendants of the deceased.

If these rents fell into arrear, the bones of the departed ancestor were thrown by the priest into the yard, and the grave became "to let," as will be seen from the photograph. The heap of bones suggests that a large number of the departed had, through their descendants, been unable to pay their grave rents, and hence the homeless condition of their osseous remains.

As I waited, the wounded were being brought from the front, and the most ghastly sights were to be seen.

Referring to the outbreak of hostilities, the *Singapore Free Press*, dated February 23rd, states: —

"There is something deeply pathetic in to-day's telegram, taken along with the news from the Philippines in the course of the mail, giving details of the deplorable rupture at Manila and Iloilo. The steed having been stolen, the American Senate locks the stable door. It is unhappily the thing so often anticipated with apprehension, which has occurred. Procrastination, want of grasp of the situation, and, it is suspected in some quarters, a design to

present the Filipino government in an unfavourable light to the United States government, are collectively responsible for the fatal breakdown of friendly relations between the so-called 'liberators' and the successful Filipino revolution."

CHAPTER XV

Battle of Santa Ana — Position of English Residents — Retreat of Filipinos — A Conversation with an American Officer — Future Difficulties of the Campaign — Butchery of Filipinos — A proclamation of Aguinaldo — The Filipinos repulsed — Higgins's House shelled

THE English residents at Santa Ana had the most trying time on the night of the 4th, and had it not been for the kindness and generosity of the Filipinos, many British subjects would, no doubt, have been killed by the bullets of the Americans.

When the battle began, the English could not realise the situation. They knew the Filipino general in charge of the Santa Ana forces was absent at Mololos, and therefore they could not understand how the attack could have been commenced by the Filipinos, nor why the Americans should have fired upon them. A meeting of the Europeans was hastily called, and their position considered, and it was decided that they should all take refuge in the house of Mr. and Mrs. M——, which was

more strongly built, and consequently more likely to be bullet proof.

All through the night the men stood covering the bodies of the women, who remained bravely motionless, waiting their expected end. The bullets were pattering on the walls, and whistling through their rooms and around their house. The groans of the wounded and the dying could plainly be heard.

The Filipino officers frequently came to them and offered them encouragement, altered their positions as the firing was changed, and generally inspired them with renewed hope and consequently renewed strength to bear the terrors of their position.

As I have stated, Santa Ana is situated on the Rio Pasig, which was now patrolled by a small American armed launch, and its guns were directed and fired upon the town. This shelling of the European and native houses added to the fears and dangers of the people huddled together in Mr. M——'s house.

It was well known that General Otis had maps of Santa Ana, in which all the European houses were marked and their positions located, and it was therefore scandalous that shells should have been unnecessarily thrown into the houses of British residents.

When the Filipinos were closely pressed for the want of ammunition, the officers informed

the M—— party they had only ammunition enough to cover their retreat, and their trials were now ended, as the town would soon be in the hands of the Americans. The Filipinos retired from Santa Ana in perfect order, fighting all the time, with determination, energy, and courage. In this fashion did the Americans take Santa Ana.

In Manila, on the 5th, I saw as a prisoner being marched to quarters by the Americans, Señor Escamillo, one of General Aguinaldo's secretaries, or interpreters. He had spent the night of the 4th in Manila. He bowed to me as he passed. Had hostilities been commenced by General Aguinaldo, as was alleged by the Americans at the time, is it probable or likely that Escamillo would have laid himself open to arrest by his presence in Manila?

In the battles of the 4th and 5th, there was a great deal of street fighting, in which the Filipinos were accused by the Americans of the grossest treachery. I know such accusations were untrue. The Filipino losses, of course, were much greater than the American; but it must be remembered that not only had the Filipinos to resist the American forces, but they had also to face the shells which were being poured in upon them from the American warships.

"This," I remarked to an American officer,

as we saw the destruction caused by American shells, "is not war; it is simple massacre and murderous butchery. How can these men resist your ships, away at sea? What wrongs have they committed, to warrant and to justify this fearful slaughter? You came to protect them! Aguinaldo came to assist you! I am a stranger here. As such, I must tell you, I am horrified and amazed. I know you could have arranged with the Filipinos easily and satisfactorily." My friend replied: "The Filipinos have swollen heads; they only need one licking, and they will go crying to their homes, or we shall drive them into the sea, within the next three days." — "But why," I asked, "have you forgotten that without their assistance you must have had serious trouble with the Spaniards in taking Manila, and many of the officers you have fighting for you now, would have been killed and great numbers of your men would have been sacrificed? Is this remembrance worth nothing to you? Does it not appeal to your sense of justice, as a great grown-up man, fighting to the death a little weak chap, who has not harmed you, because he does not want to give away everything that he possesses?"

This officer knew that his cause was wrong; so he merely said: "Perhaps you are right; but must we not obey orders? The United States

wants the Philippines, and we have got to take them!"

How little did this man know of the Filipino people, their determination, their power, or their love for country! A Filipino general once told me, "We have twenty, thirty, forty, or fifty men to each gun, all ready in rotation to take the place of a dead man."

Before the Americans can conquer the Filipinos and their islands, they will have lost the great bulk of their army, and many years must elapse before the American flag is hoisted in conquest over the Philippine Islands. When this is accomplished, will the American nation be proud of their conquest, and will they not in days to come reproach a government which disgraced its people by the betrayal of their trust? Will they not be always reminded by all civilised powers of their broken promises and pledges to a community whose offence was the aid it gave and in return for which America waged a war of extermination? I have travelled in Luzon, and I know that fighting will be confined to the wooded and swampy lands of the interior, all of which are known to the Filipinos. The fevers and diseases of a climate in which the natives can live and thrive, will kill the foreign campaigner with his enforced privations.

It was well known to the residents of Manila, and admitted by the Americans, that the first

shot was fired by them, with the result that large numbers of men, women, and children were killed. The Americans in forty-eight hours slaughtered more defenceless people than did the Spaniards in two centuries. The fate of the treaty of peace was to be decided on the 6th day of February, and it is said that the conflict was commenced for political reasons to insure the ratification of the American treaty with Spain. The *Call*, a San Francisco journal dated February 5th, 1899, states: —

"President McKinley said to an intimate friend to-night that the Manila engagement would, in his opinion, insure the ratification of the treaty to-morrow. Senators Lodge and Spooner being interviewed by the *Call* representative to-night, expressed the same opinion." And the American journal *Freedom*, published in Manila, endeavouring to justify the attack of the Americans on the Filipinos, editorially states: "The Philippines have been sanctified with the blood of American soldiers. Henceforth they are sacred, and none but traitors will advocate their relinquishment to other powers. America has done her whole duty; she mustered her thousands at humanity's call, on land and sea; she told the world in no uncertain language that tyranny must cease in Cuba and in the Philippines; for months and

months she has endured the insolence and insults of the ragamuffins she saved, she fed, and befriended, and all in the interests of peace. Like an indulgent parent, she withheld the chastening rod, in a vain effort to reason with a scabby herd, who, cowards at heart, and low and base, mistook friendliness and compassion for fear and cowardice, until at last, when forbearance ceased to be a virtue, her bugles rung out the call 'to arms,' and most lasting and terrible indeed has been the lesson she taught."

This cowardly attack in a Manila newspaper must be accepted as semi-official. All articles in journals were subject to a most rigid censorship, and little or nothing was permitted to be published without the approval of the censor.

How had the Filipinos in their relations with the Americans so conducted themselves as to warrant the scurrilous abuse contained in this article?

The *Hong Kong Daily Press* dated February 27th, 1899, published the following particulars, furnished by Filipinos from Mololos, as to how hostilities commenced. The journal naturally declined to take responsibility for the truth of the statements.

"What we have tried to avoid at all costs has at last happened. On the night of the 4th

instant, when we were quite unprepared, General Otis, having formally assured our Commissioners in a duly drawn-up act made during the conference that the aggression would not come from Americans, suddenly attacked the whole of our lines around Manila. General Otis has been propagating rumours to the effect that the aggression came from our side, but nobody, not even the foreigners, believed it. All the details now conclusively indicate that the attack was prepared by the Americans.

"The day before, several foreigners wished to visit Otis, but he would not receive them because he was holding a council of war. At 6 P.M. on the 4th, the river steamer *Laguna de Bay* got up steam (this steamer had been armoured and mounted as a gunboat by the Americans) and went to Santa Ana, and at 9.30 P.M. commenced to bombard the town, simultaneously with the American attack on our lines."

The semi-official and other papers of Manila of the 14th instant have since admitted that the aggression came from the American side.

"On the same date, the 4th, the American reënforcements arrived. No extraordinary or sudden movement of American troops occurred at the time of the outbreak, which clearly indi-

cates that all of the forces occupied positions previously assigned to them. On the strength of the American word, General Ricarte, commander in chief around Manila, and Colonel S. Miguel, commanding the Mariquina and San Juan regiment, were at Mololos, attending a conference called by the President, all of which is well known to Mr. —— (an Englishman).

"Our troops were taken by surprise without any leaders" (which is also admitted by General Reeve), "but they fought heroically and only abandoned their positions after their ammunition gave out, and they were exhausted by hunger and fatigue. At the outset of the battle the Americans succeeded in cutting the telegraph wires to Mariquina, and thus stopped communication. Nevertheless, the Americans lost heavily; amongst their killed and wounded being one general, two colonels, and many officers. It is reported all the churches and hospitals in Manila are full of wounded.

"The Americans have committed many atrocities in Manila. They set fire to the hamlet of Paco, shooting women and children fleeing from their homes:" (confirmed by European residents in Paco, who were eye-witnesses), "burnt Santa Ana, and are looting and robbing houses in Manila and the suburbs, and the places they have succeeded in taking. For a few

days they allowed families to leave Manila, but they robbed and despoiled all who left, making even women denude themselves. One of the latter who resisted being denuded boxed a soldier's ears who had dared to lay his hands on her. She was shot on the spot. Even tragedies have their ridiculous side, however, and a cheeky woman, noticing what was happening to her companions, suddenly placed herself in the habit of Lady Godiva before the astonished soldier, who was so confounded that she got away free. The Americans, thanks to their unexpected movement, have succeeded in advancing their lines to Malibay Pateros, Pasig Mariquina, and Caloogan, after looting all they could find in their way, and burning every Filipino house. Nevertheless, the native soldiers are recovering and regaining their strength. The latest news from the front is that the Americans are nonplussed, seeing that every inch of ground is costing them severe losses. We cannot yet say what is going to happen. Yesterday the Americans were obliged to abandon Pasig, retiring to Santa Rosa near Malapad-na-Dalo. According to rumours, the German cruiser *Irene* is being strictly watched by the Americans, who entertain the most unfounded suspicions that she has brought a supply of arms. The Americans may deny as much as they like the shooting of women and children

in Paco, but unfortunately for them there is abundant evidence from resident European eye-witnesses who viewed the massacre from their own windows, to prove the assertion without the resorting to Filipino evidence at all. The Americans have yet to learn that something more than brute force is required to make these 'barbarians,' against their will, part of the American people. Benevolent assimilation is the climax of humbug and hypocrisy as applied to that forcible annexation which Mr. McKinley once declared would be criminal aggression."

I can corroborate a great part of these particulars. It would be interesting and edifying to hear whether President McKinley by any instructions, implied or otherwise, authorised General Otis to attack the Filipinos on the night of the 4th, and also what information General Otis gave the President from Manila on the 5th of February, 1899, after the battle.

The following is a proclamation issued by General Aguinaldo, dated February 5th:—

"*To the Filipino People:*

"By the proclamation of yesterday, I have published the outbreak of hostilities between the Filipino forces and the American army of

occupation in Manila, unjustly and unexpectedly provoked by the latter. My manifesto of January 8th last, published the grievances suffered by the Filipino army at the hands of the American army. The proclamation of General Otis relates to the insults to the Filipino people, the constant outrages and taunts which have caused the misery of the people of Manila, and finally the useless conferences and the contempt constantly shown towards the Philippine government have proved a premeditated transgression of justice and of liberty. I know that war always has produced great disasters. I know that the Filipino people have not yet recovered from past losses, and are not in the best position to endure others. But I also know by experience how bitter is slavery, and by experience also I know that we should sacrifice all on the altar of our honour and the national integrity so unjustly attacked. I have tried to avoid, as far as it has been possible for me to do so, armed conflict, in my endeavours to assure our independence, by pacific means, and to avoid more costly sacrifices. But all my efforts have been useless before the measureless pride of the American government and of its representatives in these islands, who have treated me as a 'rebel' because I defend the sacred interests of my country and do not make myself an instrument of their dastardly inten-

tions. Past campaigns will have convinced you that the people are strong when they wish to be so. Without arms we have driven from our beloved country our ancient masters, and without arms we can repulse the foreign invasion as long as we wish to do so. Providence always has means in reserve and promptly helps the weak in order that they may not be annihilated by the strong, and that justice may be done and humanity progress. Be not discouraged; our independence has been watered with the generous blood of our martyrs; blood which may be shed in future will strengthen it; nature has never despised generous sacrifices. But in order that our efforts may not be wasted, that our desires may be listened to and our independence gained, it is indispensable that we adjust our actions to the rules of law and of right leading to triumph over our enemies and to conquer our own evil passions.

"EMILIO AGUINALDO,

"*President of the Filipino Republic.*

"MOLOLOS, February 5th, 1899."

By the 6th of February, fighting was away from Manila in the neighbourhood of the water-works at Santolan, which were ultimately taken, practically uninjured, by the Americans, with the exception that certain important con-

necting pipes had been removed and buried by the Filipinos, but were soon unearthed and refitted. The American ships, all through, continued shelling the Filipino lines at Tondo and Caloogan. Mr. Higgins was able to send a message to Manila, asking Mr. Wood to give notice to General Otis that they were shelling his house, and that he would hold the Americans responsible for loss of life and the destruction of his property.

CHAPTER XVI

Seizure of Private Property by American Volunteers — Murder of Filipino Coachman — Women improperly examined — Caloogan taken — Aguinaldo publishes Proclamation — Commissioners appointed — Opinions of their Capabilities

THE American soldiers, after the outbreak of hostilities, were permitted to seize private carriages for their own use, and consequently no carriage was safe in the streets. On one occasion, two Mestisa ladies, driving over Paco bridge, were stopped by a gang of American soldiers, and were ordered out of their own carriage. The soldiers got in, as many of them as possible, and told the Filipino coachman to drive on. The coachman, seeing his mistress in the road crying, declined to do so. A soldier then raised his gun and shot him dead, pushed his body from the box, mounted it in his place, and drove the carriage away. This case of brutal murder caused much consternation in the town. In consequence of the feeling exhibited by the foreigners, General Otis was compelled to issue orders forbidding pri-

vate soldiers to seize in future carriages in the streets. The man who killed the coachman, instead of being immediately shot, was permitted to go unpunished. I was driving with my wife one afternoon to Santa Ana, when our carriage was stopped by an American soldier, who had with him a very dirty-looking woman whom he told to get into the victoria, which she did, seating herself between my wife and myself. In answer to my remonstrance the fellow threatened the life of myself and my wife. There was nothing for it but to endure the outrage. The man mounted the box and seated himself beside our Filipino coachman. At Paco, I ordered the coachman to stop, and I informed the uninvited guests that we were going no farther. "Oh, but you are," he replied, "or, anyway, the carriage is. We are driving to Santa Ana, and if you don't want to go, you can just get out right here." The man was armed, and with the examples which had been set him, and which had been passed over unpunished, we decided to drive to Santa Ana. I told him that beyond that I would not take him. "Oh, well, I guess that suits us," he replied. He stopped the carriage along the route and pointed out the dead then lying about to the woman seated by our sides. We deposited the pair at Santa Ana and saw no more of them. On our return to Manila, we met a

private carriage, which of course had been appropriated. It contained a number of drunken soldiers, with loaded guns, and was being driven by a man in a most intoxicated condition. On seeing us they shouted, "Drive right through that —— —— carriage, and kill the lot!" and the driver yelled, "You bet, boys! you just watch; by G——, I'll fix 'em." We avoided them, however, but with difficulty.

Street scenes were common between the American ordinary soldiers and the Filipino men and women. The latter they stripped to discover their sex, on the pretence that they concealed arms. This disgraceful treatment was permitted both after and before the conflict of the 4th of February. The inhabitants were forbidden to be in the streets after 8 o'clock P.M., after which hour people were shot at sight. Every Filipino was taken prisoner who was in the quarters of Paco, Santa Ana, and neighbouring environs of Manila.

I wish it to be clearly understood that the Americans treated their prisoners, both Filipino and Spanish, with the utmost consideration and humanity. Whilst on the subject, I will mention a pathetic incident which took place at Santa Ana immediately after the American occupation of the town. Mr. F—— and I went to the quarters of General King at Santa Ana, and while looking over the Filipino prisoners we

found a chit[1] collector of the Manila Club and his son. Mr. F—— immediately applied for the discharge of both, guaranteeing their peaceful intentions, and that they were not so-called rebels. The commanding officer consented to release the father to Mr. F——, but declined to grant the freedom of the son. The parting between the father and son was most affecting. The son called upon the father to protect his wife and child, and if he should never see them again, to bid them farewell for him and to say that on his death their names would be upon his lips, and would be remembered in his prayers.

On another occasion, my wife was waiting for me in the carriage whilst I called upon Mr. T—— at his office. A soldier on guard was standing by the carriage fumbling with his loaded gun, which suddenly was fired, the bullet only just missing my wife's head. Everybody ran from their offices to learn the cause. The soldier said: "Well, I guess there's something wrong with the lock of my gun. I'll just go along now to the barracks and change it."

On the 11th of February, the Americans attacked and took Caloogan, with the assistance of the monitors and other warships, which played very important parts in the war against

[1] *Chit* is a note signed by a member admitting his indebtedness for what is received, and these chits are paid monthly.

the Filipinos. The semi-official journal, the *Manila Times*, dated February 15th, states: —

"Arrangements had been made with Admiral Dewey so that the ships could shell the rebels without endangering the American advance. This was a matter requiring specially careful planning, because the country is so thickly wooded in parts. Therefore it was agreed that the ships and artillery on shore should fire for forty-five minutes, and then wait. The sound of these guns from the cemetery at exact intervals of ten seconds should be the signal for a general advance of the whole line of infantry, after which it would be dangerous to shell. The operation worked like clockwork. The shelling routed the 'rebel' ranks, and when the infantry advanced, the natives stampeded. Marching was not by any means easy on account of the ridges and sand holes of the rice-fields, the tangled undergrowth of the woods, and the thick clumps of impenetrable cane-brake. The orders were to advance in open order, five hundred yards without firing, halt, advance another five hundred yards, halt again, and then rush in and perform bayonet and butt drill for just such space of time as there was anybody to perform it on."

From the above it will be seen that Caloogan was taken by the American gunboats, and not

in reality by the military forces. It can easily be imagined how many houses and people would remain after a storm of shells lasting three-quarters of an hour.

On the 13th of February, 1899, President Aguinaldo published the following further proclamation : —

"PROCLAMATION OF GENERAL AGUINALDO TO THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

"The present war with the American forces has left us Filipinos no other recourse than to defend at all costs our lives and our homes. If we yielded, we should only be foolishly placing ourselves at the mercy of their rifles and cannon, whilst they neither respect our honour nor property, but barbarously massacre women and children. Manila has been the witness of the most horrible outrages. There the Americans have confiscated vehicles, animals, the savings of families, and have given as a reason for such conduct, the necessities of war. In Paco, San Ana, and other places, they have burnt houses and shot defenceless women and children. On all sides, they have taken by force anything they require, offering in exchange to their owners the mouths of their guns. Racial and caste domination have passed by, but now the dominion of force, accompanied by the repugnant barbarity of primitive times, is presented to us. Do not hope for compassion or consideration.

Pusillanimity and apathy only inspire contempt. If the flame of your sacred love for your fatherland does not burn in your breasts, if your hearts remain cold to the magic conjuration of this holy war of independence, you are worthy only to be slaves, pariahs, and helots. The national honour has been compromised. In the press, in the tribune, in your feasts, and family circles, you have loudly proclaimed your love of liberty, and solemnly promised before the civilised world, that you would fight for freedom till death. Even our women have volunteered to take up arms, if necessary. The hour has arrived. The fatherland is in danger, and it is necessary that the Filipino people carry out their promises, if they have learned the dignity of liberty during the short period of their emancipation. Do not repent of your words. You can expect nothing except from yourselves. The Americans declared war on Spain under the pretext of liberating those oppressed by the latter, and now the victims of Spain are groaning under the slavery of American brute force; the Americans came here as 'champions and liberators' seconding our struggles in favour of liberty, and after we have assisted them against the Spaniards, the Americans have seized the whole fruits of victory. In manifestos and proclamations they have been announcing that they only desire our liberty, and they assured

us in the last conference that they would not be provokers of hostilities. We have all seen, how they, when we were entirely unprepared, attacked us unexpectedly, and inhumanly bombarded our nipa houses. They robbed us of our money and ornaments, destroyed our provisions and everything necessary for life, — all with the object of implanting here a more irritating and more barbarous domination than that of the past. They are making themselves absolute masters of this rich patrimony of our race. Never fear. We have elements enough to resist any invasion and shake off any foreign yoke. There is no human force which can stand against a people to whom slavery is odious even to death. Show to all nations that you are worthy of independence, by knowing how to appreciate and defend it. Prepare to conquer or die. Life has no charm without honour and liberty. The shades of our martyrs and forefathers conjure you. In consideration of the foregoing, and confident that all Filipinos will not fail to care for their children, their wives, their possessions, and above all their native soil which contains all that they love in this world, I, in conjunction with our council of government, decree the following: —

"(1) All local juntas will constitute themselves into juntas of defence, and to this effect

will study what means, works, and fortifications are necessary to insure the protection and security of the territory in their jurisdiction.

"(2) The local prefect will execute the orders decided upon by the local junta for this object, organising for the purpose a company of militia, without counting upon the police force of each township. In this service every male between the ages of sixteen and fifty years of age will take his turn by cabecerias, excepting only those belonging to the regular army or the flying columns.

"(3) The local juntas will designate three citizens of renowned patriotism and honesty, who will form the juntas of succour, and administer the resources which on the invitation of the local mayor and the head men of the hamlets, the inhabitants may offer in money or kind for the common defence.

"(4) The members of the junta of succour, assisted by those of the militia which the mayor may place at their disposal, will care for the lodging and maintenance of soldiers and guerillas on the march, especially those fresh from action. They will also especially tend and assist the sick and wounded. They must likewise maintain those whose turn it is to serve in the militia. Lastly, they must aid in giving all the assistance which the military administration requires from the local mayor for regular soldiers and guerilla bands.

"(5) The local mayor will see that guards, or watchmen, are placed on all works of defence which they have ordered to be made, as also on all places most exposed to invasion. They will take care that all males, free of service, cultivate the fields and sow the alimentary produce suitable to the season. They will also take care that no inhabitants forget their patriotism, and make use of the scarcity produced by war to sell their effects to the military administration at enhanced prices, but take what is reasonable and just. Because they must understand, that, failing defenders, the enemy will enter and take by force all the savings and property of the Filipinos, and sacrifice the innocent victims.

"(6) The local mayors, subject to the favourable report of the junta, can issue gratuitous licenses for firearms to respectable inhabitants, but these will be confiscated if they should be employed in the execution of acts condemned by law. Those obtaining such licenses are obliged to assist at war, fight for the defence of the township, or at least cede their arms temporarily to those who wish to fight. Every inhabitant is obliged to provide himself with a 'bolo,' or incur a fine of five dollars. This must be produced within ten days after the publication of this decree in the locality. The decree of the 15th of November last, in all parts referring to arms, is herewith cancelled.

"(7) The local mayors complying with the recommendations of this decree, will have the military honours and obligations of leaders of flying columns, prescribed in the general order of the 7th instant, which is published below.

"Those failing to comply may be deposed and relieved from their offices without further inquiry.

"Given at Mololos, February 13, 1899.

"EMILIO AGUINALDO.

"For the council Apolonario Nacini."

Is this the proclamation of a barbarian addressed to a barbaric race? The laws decreed in it are surely those of a cultured mind and fit for a civilised people! The Americans took temporarily every Filipino town, large or small, around Manila within gun distance of the ships. The *Hong Kong Daily Press* of February 23rd, 1899, thus expressed the views of many unprejudiced people in that great city: "The absence of any civil service in the states, and the professed doctrine that to the victor belong the spoils, are responsible for much of the outrage that is now the rule in the Philippine Islands. What, it is asked, would be the fate of the Filipinos, with a fresh set of officials sent out every few years to govern them, and make fortunes out of them in that term? Then, there is the protectionist policy of the United States, which

may or may not be imposed on the Philippines, if the islands are annexed; for it has been imposed in Hawaii, and a very strong party in the States are in favour of its imposition on the Philippines, the argument being advanced that there can be no use in holding the islands, if they are not to be made an exclusive market for American goods.

"America might pursue a more enlightened policy in the Philippines, but she has as yet given no guarantee of such purpose; in fact, she has given no guarantees at all, but asks the natives to submit unconditionally, and trust to Providence that they find their new masters kinder than their old ones. An indefinite promise is held out that they will be given self-government when they are ready for it, but no indication is given whether the period of education will be counted by years or centuries. The resistance of the Filipinos does not seem surprising under these circumstances. The time certainly seems to have arrived when the Americans should definitely state what their intentions are, so that the Filipinos may know how they stand, and whether resistance is called for. If it is intended, as a recent vote of Congress seems to show, to grant the natives autonomy, it might as well be granted before as after the conquest, and so save bloodshed."

The *Singapore Free Press*, dated March

23rd, 1899, says: "It was telegraphed the other day that mountain guns were being sent out to the Philippines. That statement has a double explanation. We have it on good authority, that through some mistake heavier guns have been sent to the Philippines than were required — in fact, almost guns of position, in place of the light field-guns wanted. The second explanation is, that it appears to be determined to proceed vigorously against the Filipino forces by a systematic advance into the hill country, of which, indeed, the bulk of the land area of the Philippines consists. That has but one meaning, — that it is intended to push on *à outrance* the work of subjugating the Filipinos. We do not yet see, and it is sad to say it, any indication that an opportunity will be made for an armistice, and for the promotion, even at this late hour, of a final amicable arrangement between the Americans and the Filipinos. It is rather a policy of following them up into the hills and forests, and worrying them out of cover in detail that is to be adopted. It is a purpose to wear them down to the last gasp — a policy of pacification by extermination. It can be done, without a doubt. But how long will it take? How many American dollars will it cost? How many American lives will be sacrificed by exposure to rains and malaria, by risks of ambush and surprise?"

Though the Americans were in possession of Cavite, Manila, Tondo, Caloogan, Parañaque, Paco, Santa Ana, Pasig, and Iloilo, they were in perpetual conflict with the Filipino forces whom they had to defeat, and will have again and yet again to defeat, before the Americans can consider their position in these captured towns a permanent possession. But in the interior, when they will no longer have the protection of their warships, they will find the Filipinos are not the easy prey they have anticipated. It will take them many years of hard fighting and arduous campaigning, before they will subject them. I do not propose to recount the campaigns of the Americans, or the failures or successes of the Filipinos in all the many battles that have occurred and which are yet to be fought. I have undertaken this work merely to record truthfully, and without exaggeration, the facts which led to the commencement of American hostilities against the Filipinos, of which America and her people, and all other civilised nations, are largely ignorant. As I stated in an early chapter, the censor of Manila controlled all cable messages so strictly that the world, and particularly the American people, have been unacquainted with the absurd reasons which led up to the deliberate and, as I believe I have shown, unnecessary declaration of war between the American and Filipino people.

In Hong Kong, I had the pleasure of meeting the special Commissioners, Mr. Schurman and Mr. Worcester, sent from America to inquire into the details of the question at issue between the Americans and the Filipinos. The commission consisted of the following: Colonel Denby, Admiral Dewey, Major General Otis, Presidents Schurman and Worcester, and Mr. McArthur, acting secretary. Regarding these commissioners, I quote from the *Singapore Free Press*, dated March 23, 1899, page 189, the following:—

"MORE AMERICAN OPINIONS; REWARD FOR COMPLICITY

"The 'Colonel,' Charles Denby, who, while a member of the war investigation committee attained unenviable notoriety in connection with the beef trust, which supplied the army with poisonous or worthless beef at a high price, is the same Denby of Indiana who was appointed by President Cleveland Minister in China. Not one of these, except Dewey, is likely to have the least sympathy with labour or human rights in any form. But any commission is an impertinence, if not an outrage. The people of the Philippines are infinitely better judges of their own affairs than any American."

With regard to Mr. Schurman, I was greatly impressed by his kindly intentions toward the Filipinos, and he appeared most anxious to obtain every conceivable information with regard to the question upon which he was to be one of the judges.

Mr. Worcester had had experience in some of the Philippine Islands many years previously, where he had been scientifically engaged. He recently published a work upon the Archipelago, but he was quite unacquainted with the new Filipino race which has arisen during the last twenty years. Therefore, it was obviously necessary from the views he expressed to me to overcome his prejudice against "these uncivilised people." In this Commission why did the American government not appoint men like the Hon. John Barrett, who was lately minister to Siam? This gentleman had a long experience of Eastern life and character. He was a diplomatist of great ability, and was at that time in the neighbourhood of the Philippine Islands. The special Commissioners sent by the government, with the exception of Mr. Schurman, whom I believe to be an extremely able and capable man, were utterly and entirely unable to deal with the important and weighty questions which they had been employed to settle and decide. It is not, therefore, surprising that they arrived at no conclusion, and

that the determination of this inhuman war cannot be hoped for, and much less predicted, from any action of these men. The wronged and downtrodden Filipinos could expect nothing from a packed jury.

CONCLUSION

I HAVE now concluded my history of those strange and most remarkable events which characterised the advent of the United States in the islands of the Philippines. I have endeavoured to lay before my readers sufficient evidence to show that the Filipinos are a race worthy of consideration; and I submit I have proved that they are a people of high intentions, of high principles, educated and refined; and I consider their patriotism has made them even holier than their religion. All Englishmen admire, respect, and would support the American people in all that they did in the cause of humanity; but innate sentiments must be forgotten and abandoned where a weak people is being oppressed by a strong nation; whatever the relations of that nation may be, however allied the instincts and interests may be, they must not be permitted to influence the calm decisions of justice and mercy, nor to prejudice in favour of the one nor the other.

It is certain to those in the East, and also, I am sure, to those in the West, that the *American people* are unacquainted with the history of

events, proved, I submit, beyond doubt, which I have related. My impeachment is not of those who have been intentionally deceived, but of the American government, and their necessary parasites, who have deliberately kept the American people misinformed, in order that they should form no just opinion of their true and honourable position in the Philippines.

The American "Declaration of Intentions," which was announced to justify the war with Spain, contained in effect the simple proposition that the people of the United States, tired of the cruel and oppressive tyranny of Spain over a struggling and suffering people, interfered in the name of a merciful humanity. America could no longer stand by and witness the terrible outrages of the sixteenth century reënacted in the nineteenth century before the eyes of the Christian world, on the very threshold, as it were, of her republic; and so she, like another St. George, unsheathed her sword to slay the pestilential dragon.

She therefore released, with amazing skill and promptness, Cuba from the hands that were throttling her; and having covered herself with glory in all that she did and attempted in the West, she turned her victorious arms to the East in order to *free* the Filipinos from the same deadly grasp that had for centuries been stifling and destroying their social and commercial life.

America went to the Philippines, not to conquer and annex, but to free the people of those islands from Spanish domination and to drive out Spain from Manila.

Admiral Dewey, as I have shown, carried out his instructions in destroying the Spanish fleet in the Philippines, and in so doing he believed his mission in the East had ended. At the commencement of the war, the American government indignantly repudiated any suggestion that it was her intention to extend her dominions or to expand her empire; and therefore Dewey can be charged with no wrong when he is charged with having approached, directly and indirectly, Aguinaldo, the natural enemy of Spain in the Philippines, and with having promised him conditions of independence, in consideration of his becoming the ally of the United States, and of his assisting that government in destroying Spanish power forever in the East; and so the leaders of the Filipino nation were invited to return to their native country. The initiative was not therefore taken by them, for they were asked to assist the Americans in their actions against Spain.

The American government cannot plead ignorance of it, because Consul General Pratt "duly notified" his government on the departure of Aguinaldo from Singapore. The American

government cannot deny that it was aware that Dewey had carried Aguinaldo to Cavite in his warship *McCulloch*, nor can it deny that it was aware that its commanders in Philippine waters had armed Aguinaldo and his forces, because attached to the correspondence which accompanied President McKinley's message to Congress, on the ratification of the treaty with Spain, was a memorandum drafted by Major General Greene, in which he stated, "The insurgents were furnished *with arms* and moral support by our navy, prior to our arrival, and we *cannot ignore obligations, either to the insurgents* or to foreign nations, which *our* own acts have imposed upon us." Yet have not those obligations, so earnestly and solemnly made and accepted, and believed by the Filipinos, been broken and "ignored" by the representative government of the American people? These people fought for their freedom on the American side, vanquishing at every point and at every "zone" the common enemy, the Spanish nation; and in return what have they received? Treatment worse than Spain inflicted during all her centuries of occupation, cruelties, which no civilised power in the world could approve, and of which the American people will be ashamed.

It has been stated, and is daily alleged in the American press, that no promises were made, that no pledges were given by Dewey and his

representatives to General Aguinaldo. How, then, was it that Aguinaldo was at Manila? Taken to the Philippines by the Americans in one of their own ships? At their own urgent request? Armed by them? Spanish prisoners taken at the battle of Manila Bay delivered into their hands by Dewey? Quartered at Cavite? Permitted a flag which was saluted by their admiral?—Dewey! Authorised and encouraged to make war upon the Spaniards? To take prisoners? Supported at Subig, and the town handed over to them by the Americans? How came these and other things to be allowed, if Aguinaldo and his forces were not the allies of the American government?

It is inconceivable that Aguinaldo, who had been fighting the Spaniards for Philippine independence, would have returned to the islands, and there have raised his standard in the American cause, if the promises made were only to reap a worse servitude than that inflicted by Spain. If the American representatives had informed Aguinaldo that it was America's intention to subjugate or exterminate the Filipino race after they had assisted America in her conquest of Spain in the Pacific, is it possible or is it probable that Aguinaldo would have conducted his victorious campaign, sacrificing the lives of many of his best citizens and friends, in order to aid a policy which threatened the

destruction of his proposed republic and the hopes of his independence.

Arrangements were come to, as I have shown, whereby the Filipinos were to become free; and I cannot believe that Admiral Dewey, who is a man of honour and integrity, will stand by longer and witness the oppression and destruction of the Filipino race.

America conquered Spain in the West; but without the assistance of the Filipinos her difficulties would have been greater in the East, and the price that was promised to Aguinaldo should be paid.

The United States government may boast of the purchase of the Philippines from Spain; but could that power sell a colony which she practically no longer controlled or possessed? Could the American government acquire a title which no longer was vested in Spain? Have the Filipinos made unjust demands of the American government? For what have they asked? The fulfilment of America's assurances and the promises which were given. Freedom without a conqueror's oppression. They have not demanded nor do they desire the withdrawal of American protection or military control in the islands. They want, and I think with every justification, a government such as exists in the Strait Settlements. When the American people understand their

position in the Philippine Islands, they will remedy the wrongs that have been done this most injured and oppressed race.

In the course of my story, I have referred to incidents of a social character, in order to show the reader, in the most direct manner, that the Filipinos are civilised and refined in their private and domestic life; that they are not, in fact, barbarous or half savage, as has been so frequently alleged.

Aguinaldo, on his return to the islands, immediately forbade bull, and cock fighting within the districts he controlled, proclaiming they were sports of cruelty which could be tolerated by no civilised power. Charges of every kind have been made against the Filipinos by those who are entirely unacquainted with them; but all admit, and it has been fully and freely stated, even by their traducers, that they know how to conduct themselves in front of an enemy. In their dealings with the Americans, even after their falsity, they showed themselves to be marvellously trusting and patient under wrongs and conduct that they could not possibly have anticipated. They have proved themselves to be a resolute and fearless people, with strong, warlike capacity, at once truthful, faithful, prudent in their cause and that of their allies, and it was with the greatest reluctance that they credited the great nation, which

they believed had come to emancipate them, with duplicity and double dealing.

Wars in modern times are avoided with the utmost care by civilised and humane governments, who endeavour by diplomacy to lessen the gravity of vexed or unsettled questions likely to cause a rupture in friendly relations, or to terminate in war; but in the Philippines the American generals in command would listen to no negotiations, would accept no amicable settlement of questions which they alone had raised by their own mismanagement, indiscretion, and incompetency. They apparently desired to kill without reason and without right. All the softer and gentler inclinations of refined men appear to have become extinct in the generals in command of the American forces in the Philippines, after the taking of Manila on the 13th of August, 1898, and even so, if the farce enacted on that day had caused blood madness in the then commander and his successors, it was the duty of the home government to temper with discretion and mercy a policy of war without cause, a sacrifice of honour without reason.

The great American nation has been looked upon as the morning star of hope to the oppressed and down-trodden people of the world, and here is an opportunity for them to show their chivalry and their strong sense of even-

handed justice. The noble proclamations of Aguinaldo which, like a papal decree, is addressed "Urbi et Orbi," has shown to the world that the one desire of the Filipinos is a modified and constitutional freedom; and freedom, as the Americans well know (for with them it is an instinct), is a right that belongs to the whole human race, and whenever acquired should be like the immortal verse of Shakespeare, —

"Not for an age, but for all time,"

for

"Freedom's battle once begun,
Bequeathed by bleeding sire to son,
Tho' baffled oft, is ever won."

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

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

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